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Abstract 
Biodiversity is an environmental cache that has been maintained and developed globally over 
thousands of years. However, biodiversity loss is an international environmental issue that is 
increasingly threatening the countless ecosystem services and stabilizing abilities of 
biologically diverse ecosystems. The drivers of biodiversity loss are largely anthropogenic 
and transboundary, and without a concerted and coordinated global effort, it is likely that 
current ecosystem services and a diverse planet will be lost to future generations. While this 
issue has been recognized by the global community through multilateral environmental 
agreements, the United States has consistently refrained from engaging in these efforts. This 
paper seeks to explore the current trend of United States participation in multilateral efforts 
to address biodiversity loss, as well as the implications of its actions. This paper analyzes the 
United States’ engagement, or lack thereof, using the liberal and constructivist theories of 
international relations to examine the negative consequences of the United States’ current 
strategy of participation. This is especially important when considering the redistribution of 
power in the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity, in which the United 
States may no longer maintain a disproportionate share of power. In general, the United 
States’ lack of engagement in global environmental efforts is likely to negatively affect its 
ability to achieve future foreign policy goals, suggesting a strong motivation for the United 
States to assess and alter its current engagement strategy in biodiversity agreements. 
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I. Introduction  
“Humans are fundamentally, and to a significant extent irreversibly, changing 
the diversity of life on Earth, and most of the changes represent a loss of 
biodiversity” –Millennium Ecosystem Assessment1 
 
Biodiversity is an environmental cache that has been maintained and developed over 
thousands of years. That invaluable variety within natural systems allows the planet to 
sustain life, provide precious bounty and nutrition, gift life-saving cures, prevent catastrophic 
events and diseases, and recover from seemingly impossible obstacles. Many of the 
inherently natural processes of healthy and biodiverse ecosystems provide invaluable or 
irreplaceable ecosystem services that are critical components for the survival of humanity. 
This biodiversity exists in the myriad of species familiar to many, but it also refers to a 
necessary variety of genes, ecosystems, communities, and functions that aid in a thriving and 
healthy planet.  
Regrettably, the precious element of biodiversity has been unable to evade the effects 
of the “Anthropocene,” the concept of a new global epoch in which human activities have 
fundamentally shifted global geophysical processes (Steffen et al. 2011, Kolbert 2015, 91-
110, Waters et al. 2016). Human activities, combined with natural processes, are causing 
irreparable biodiversity loss and inciting rapid shifts in what had previously been an 
evolutionarily slow progression across the globe (Waters et al. 2016). Scientists are 
increasingly voicing grave concern over global biodiversity loss. Recently published works 
                                                 
1 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-being Synthesis. Island Press, 
Washington, D.C. 
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move toward a forceful consensus, with warnings that biodiversity is being pushed beyond 
the “safe limit” of planetary boundaries, and bringing along with it complex and detrimental 
consequences (Newbold et al. 2016, Stephen et al. 2015). In fact, some believe the rapid loss 
of global diversity will lead to the “Sixth Extinction,” placing humans in a unique historical 
position as the agents of the eternal disappearance of species en masse. If the trends of loss 
continue, it is likely to mark the current era alongside the only five other critical losses of 
life, including the infamous extinction of the dinosaurs (Kolbert 2015, 92-124). Although 
humans have fostered a myriad of important contributions in their existence, it is likely that 
none will be more pronounced than a legacy of furthering the mass extinction of life on the 
planet. Recognizing the sources of that rapid loss is an essential step in mitigating and 
preventing further deterioration of one of the planet’s most precious resources. Currently, the 
major causes of this alarming loss of biodiversity are habitat loss in the form of 
fragmentation, destruction, and degradation, invasive species, overexploitation, emerging 
diseases, co-extinction, and climate change.  
One of the most recognizable ways humans are affecting biodiversity and hastening 
its depletion is through the loss or alteration of habitat, either through fragmentation, 
degradation, or destruction of natural surroundings (National Wildlife 2016, “Habitat”). 
Habitat fragmentation refers to the severing of full habitats into separate fragments. This is 
often associated with the development of human infrastructure, in the form of roads, dams, 
and other structures that make it difficult for migration to continue. Examples of human-
motivated fragmentation consequences are regrettably common in the continental U.S. In the 
country’s most densely populated state, California, this has become a major threat to large 
mammals such as mountain lions and bobcats in the Santa Monica Mountains, trapped 
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between sparsely remaining habitats and surrounding urban landscapes (National Park 2016, 
“Habitat”). Large predators are essential for the healthy function of ecosystems by ensuring 
vegetation can thrive through a regulation of herbivores that would strip the land of 
vegetation if unchecked (Ripple et al. 2014). Considering concerns over water availability, 
the ability of healthy mountain lion populations relieve pressure from already water-stressed 
vegetation could prove critical. The degradation of habitats refers to a significant decline in 
quality that makes them less suitable to support the ecosystems that were previously thriving. 
Examples include the conversion of land for agricultural purposes or the pollution of water 
sources. The catastrophic Deepwater Horizon Oil spill in 2010 resulted in 205.8 million 
gallons of oil pollutants into the Gulf of Mexico that ultimately affected thousands of native 
wildlife, both killing marine and shore-dependent species and reducing quality of life for 
those remaining several years later (Convention on Biological 2011). Most apparent, species 
died from direct impacts of the pollutants and declined stocks for the large fishing industry in 
the Gulf states. Further, the long-term indirect impacts of declined growth rates could prove 
even more devastating, as affected species are unable to procreate and offspring experience 
birth defects that prevent maturation. While the Gulf has shown incredible resiliency, many 
of the effects of the spill are unknown, and other habitats facing similarly devastating 
degradation may not be able to likewise adapt. Finally, the ultimate loss of habitats comes in 
the form of destruction. Primary examples include deforestation, the filling in of wetlands, 
and the dredging of water bodies. According to the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP), the loss of biodiversity is being accelerated due to global deforestation, 
largely across South America and Africa, and is noted as requiring global attention to 
maintain “fundamental ecological processes” present with sustained biodiversity (United 
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Nations Environment 2011). When a species’ habitat is essentially removed from existence, 
it requires a significant amount of adaptation. If a species is unable to adapt, regardless of 
how integral it may be to the function of ecosystem services, its ultimate peril is likely. 
Regardless of the type of habitat loss, the multitude of species unable to adapt swiftly enough 
to changing conditions will be unable to fruitfully exist and contribute necessary ecosystem 
services on a planet continuing business-as-usual disregard for habitats. 
Invasive species are another major driver of biodiversity loss. While non-native 
species can occur without outside intervention, human activities are often the source of the 
introduction and dispersal of invasive species. Although not always harmful, these species 
can result in the degradation of habitats, as well as the loss of other species through 
competition for resources, the introduction of new and harmful pathogens, or the predation of 
native species. Pervasive examples within the United States include several species of Asian 
carp, Asian longhorn beetle, and the Burmese python (National Wildlife 2016, “Species”). 
One of the most recognized invasive species in the United States is the infamous zebra 
mussel. Currently wreaking havoc in the Great Lake states with their unabated reproduction, 
effectively cutting off food supplies to native species, covering beaches, and causing millions 
of dollars in structural damage, the zebra mussel is believed to have been transported from 
Europe via ballast waters in shipping commerce in the 1980’s. Today, the ultimate removal 
and attempted prevention of the zebra mussel is ongoing, but has not yet been successful 
(O’Neill 1994, National Wildlife 2016, “Mussels”). As globalization and transportation 
technologies continue to advance, it is reasonable to expect that the issue of invasive species 
will continue, develop, and evolve into an uncontrollable phenomenon. 
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Humans have also contributed to biodiversity loss through the overexploitation of 
wildlife and plants for their uses including food, clothing, medicine, and shelter. While many 
of these resources were once found in plenty, their overexploitation has resulted in the 
inability of some species to survive, and the possibility of habitat degradation or loss of 
ecosystem services as critical elements of ecosystem webs are depleted or removed. 
Examples include the depletion of animal populations such as tigers or swordfish, as well as 
medicinal plants such as American ginseng, which today fetch a high price due to their 
current rarity (National Wildlife 2016, “Overexploitation”). High profile examples include 
the killing of large game for markets, such as commercial whaling, and for sport, including 
the killing of Cecil the lion during a hunt in Zimbabwe (World 2016, Goode 2015). Although 
many species are valued, or even feared, by humans, and are thus killed en masse, it is often 
without thought to that species’ role in providing ecosystem services. While some of the 
most high-profile cases have resulted in government response to prevent the extinction of 
precious species due to human actions, it is often in vain without appropriate enforcement 
measures, and the problem continues to endanger wildlife and plants (Jowit 2010). 
Emerging diseases are also noted as a significant contributor to biodiversity loss. 
While this is not always connected to human activities, like the introduction of invasive 
species, societal actions often act as an accelerated driver for emerging diseases (Mills 2006). 
These include the amphibian chytrid fungus as well as white-nose syndrome, which are both 
being spread at rapid rates via human transportation of footwear and live animals (Kolbert 
2015, 4-22). Without the globalization of human societies, diseases like the chytrid fungus, 
responsible for major losses in the nearly 6,000 species of amphibians as one of the world’s 
most deadly infections, may never have permeated such vast swaths of area (National Park 
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2016, “Amphibian,” National Park 2016, “Frogs”). Amphibians have existed since the time 
of the dinosaurs, and have exhibited substantial resilience. However, a disease proliferated by 
humans appears to be leading to the demise of dozens of different species (Kolbert 2015, 11-
13). Likewise, the white-nose syndrome is threatening the extinction of several bat species 
largely due to the movement of humans (Center 2016, “White”). This is accompanied with 
the understanding that further biodiversity loss will only increase the transmission of 
infectious disease in a vicious positive feedback loop, creating an even more significant issue 
unless quickly addressed (Keesing 2010). 
Climate change is perhaps one of the most widely recognized and devastating process 
in which human-centered actions are contributing to the loss of biodiversity (Bellard et al. 
2012). Climate change refers to the idea that, in addition to natural processes, human-driven 
emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane are causing an 
unprecedented warming of the Earth (National Aeronautics 2016). Humans contribute to this 
phenomenon through a myriad of ways, but its essence is in the burning of fuels that has 
allowed modern society to thrive in unparalleled ways. Unfortunately, the expansion of 
society and technology, powered by ancient sunlight in the form of fuels like coal, oil, and 
gas, has resulted in negative externalities to the natural environment via dangerous shifts in 
the Earth’s climate (IPCC 2013). Due to the untold number of ways in which the global 
climate is anticipated to alter biologic processes, biodiversity is in danger from multiple 
different avenues originating from climate change. Examples include a forced change in 
range due to warming temperatures that various species are unable to adapt to, a loss of 
natural timing for vital processes such as migration and procreation, and an increase in ocean 
acidity levels that many species are similarly finding themselves unable to adapt within 
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(National Wildlife 2016, “Global”). Examples of species already in danger due to climate 
change include polar bears that are unable to adapt to record heat, and ocean coral that 
engineers a vibrant ecosystem and provides a natural home for hundreds of other species 
currently dying throughout the world’s oceans because of ocean acidification (Dell’Amore  
2014). Climate change is already occurring. While there is the possibility that the severity 
may be lessened if global emissions are drastically reduced in the near future, biodiversity is 
already in grave danger, and is expected to further decline without concerted intervention. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that each of the aforementioned drivers of 
biodiversity loss are interconnected in multiple ways. A primary example lies in the concept 
of co-extinction. This refers to the loss of one species due to the loss of a separate, but 
interrelated species. For example, certain species of butterflies face significant decline due to 
the likewise decline of larval host plants (Koh 2004). Although the specific plant species may 
not be significantly valued by society, the butterfly that is dependent on it, and the 
subsequent species in the food chain reliant on the butterfly, may be of substantial 
importance to ecosystem health and productivity. In essence, this means that the loss of one 
species may not simply be the loss of one species. While one species may be integral in the 
provision of ecosystem services or resiliency, it may also be vital for the survival of a 
succession of other species and the health of biodiversity. Further, each of the proximate 
causes of biodiversity loss interacts with one another. For example, climate change acts as an 
amplifier to several other issues. Evidence suggests that warmer temperatures are linked to a 
rise in infectious diseases, which in turn supports further loss of biodiversity (Alitzer 2013). 
Climate change is predicted to cause a rise in sea level that will continue to encroach upon 
critical habitats, creating both habitat loss and degradation, and further endangering species 
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in the process (Center 2013). In addition, invasive species can pervade a habitat to the point 
of severe degradation, affecting its ability to provide ecosystem services, and even deplete 
populations of key native species (Charles 2008).  
Considering each of the aforementioned ways in which biodiversity loss can be 
rapidly accelerated by human actions, conservation and protection efforts to halt those 
devastating consequences have similarly increased in recent years. As a country with a vast 
and diverse territorial range, the United States encompasses a wealth of biodiversity (Dobson 
1997). Regrettably, it has not been immune to anthropogenic biodiversity loss, although 
recognition of the issue has been expanding across levels and scopes of society and 
government. However, this is not an issue exclusive only to the United States. Rather, 
biodiversity loss has pervaded regions throughout the globe, irrespective of borders (Dirzo 
2003). Thus, biodiversity is, at its core, a global issue. To most effectively manage a 
transboundary issue with such widespread and pervasive repercussions, international 
cooperation is essential. Through interstate negotiations, international standards can be 
solidified into international law, creating precedent for regulating and protecting the global 
resource of biodiversity. Further, negotiations can result in coordinated multilateral action in 
which state actors work together to achieve global objectives. Multilateralism is in contrast to 
unilateral actions, which can vainly attempt to address inherently transboundary issues with 
incohesive and uncoordinated national actions (Brunnee 2004).  
In the aim of achieving both unanimous consent to global standards, as well as 
engagement in regulative multilateral actions, all state actors hold a critical role. More 
specifically, although it should be recognized that a state’s perceived power within the 
international system is often accompanied with greater influence on the text and outcomes of 
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multilateral agreements, reaching an encompassing level of protection requires the consent of 
each state actor, regardless of military or economic strength. Notably, the United States has a 
particularly important function in the success of multilateral efforts because of power 
operations within multilateral negotiations. In other words, when considering the United 
States’ powerful economic, military, and resource-dependent status in the international 
system since WWII and the collapse of the Soviet Union, “the ways in which the United 
States engages with the problem of environmental degradation are crucial for the survival of 
the planet” (Harris 2001, 68). However, attention to the United States’ engagement in 
multilateral agreements to address biodiversity loss and its associated drivers indicates 
lackluster participation, and an overall atypical level of restraint to engage in those critical 
efforts relative to the efforts of other state actors. While there are instances of U.S. 
engagement in multilateral negotiations and agreements, it consistently exhibits a clear 
preference for unilateral rather than multilateral action (Ivanova and Etsy 2008). This is 
especially the case in regards to efforts to address or improve a ‘global good,’ with the global 
environment as a key example. In general, the United States tends to prioritize security 
interests and traditional economic concerns when engaging in multilateral efforts, and tends 
distance itself from any agreements that require a concession of sovereignty for the 
betterment of nontraditional policy concerns (Schreurs 2012). Environmental policy 
concerns, and subsequent agreements to address global degradation, are an example of 
nontraditional policy concerns that are increasingly gaining global awareness and concern. 
When further accounting for the United States’ general awareness and concern for 
biodiversity loss domestically through unilateral measures to regulate and protect national 
biological resources, the United States’ pointed departure from leadership and participation 
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in international environmental efforts is an unorthodox trend when compared to other states 
actors (Brunnee 2004). When further considering anticipated power shifts within the 
international system, the United States’ current strategy of participation posits a myriad of 
potential negative consequences using liberal and constructivist paradigms of international 
relations. While other state actors continue to address global biodiversity loss through 
multilateral agreements, establishing shared values and a history of cooperation, the United 
States is voluntarily excluding itself from those negotiations and efforts. In the long-term, the 
current engagement strategy of the United States is likely to manifest into obstacles to 
achieving its future foreign policy goals. 
Thus, this paper seeks to explore the current trend of United States participation in 
multilateral efforts on biodiversity, as well as the implications of its actions. In general, the 
United States’ lack of engagement in global environmental efforts is likely to negatively 
affect its ability to achieve future foreign policy goals, suggesting a strong motivation for the 
United States to assess and alter its current engagement strategy in biodiversity agreements. 
This paper first presents international efforts to address biodiversity loss and its associated 
drivers before evaluating the United States’ engagement, or lack thereof, with the respective 
agreements. This provides an essential background for understanding the United States’ 
recent trend of restraint and nonengagement in important multilateral efforts. Next, the scope 
of the paper broadens to include the United States’ domestic efforts to address biodiversity 
loss. Upon a general finding that the U.S. recognizes the seriousness of biodiversity loss, and 
has taken measures to ensure national protection of its resources, disbelief of scientific 
consensus as an explanation for the U.S.’s inactive participation in multilateral efforts is thus 
inadequate. Rather, the lack of United States engagement suggests a connection to the nature 
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of global efforts to address biodiversity loss: through legally binding multilateral agreements 
with regulations on economically valued resources and a concession of some level of 
sovereignty for the global good.  
For that reason, the agreements discussed in the paper are each legally-binding and 
either express a specific focus on biodiversity loss through an attention to endangered species 
or biodiversity specifically, or address one of the main drivers: habitat loss or degradation, 
climate change, excessive nutrient load and other forms of pollution, over-exploitation and 
unsustainable use, and invasive alien species. The aforementioned drivers are designated as 
the most influential accelerants of biodiversity by the Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 by the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (Convention 2010). Further, the international texts and 
agreements are evaluated using the “Auditing Biodiversity: Guidance for Supreme Audit 
Institutions” general method, with a focus on compliance with agreements, laws, policies, 
and performance measurement and results (International Organization 2007). In the interest 
of reviewing the most significant international treaties, only treaties with 154 member parties 
or greater (80% of total United Nations member states) are actively evaluated (United 
Nations 2016). To compare the United States’ ratification record with that of other states, 
percentages of ratification by human development index rankings of ‘very high,’ ‘high,’ 
‘medium,’ and ‘low’ are utilized. The Human Development Index ranks states based on life 
expectancy, education, and gross national income by capita, thus establishing a relative index 
for levels of affluence (United Nations Development 2016). Considering the most 
industrialized and affluent states have disproportionate impact on the environment, 
recognized through the design of agreements that place the responsibility on the most 
industrialized states, like the Kyoto Protocol, this distinction can help distinguish ratification 
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levels. As the United States is ranked eighth in the ‘very high’ human development category 
for 2014 data, other ‘very high’ states are the most easily comparable. However, it is 
important to recognize the ratification of other state actors, regardless of human development 
ranking for global consensus and effective agreements, and thus all other categories are 
included for participation analysis. Through this, the United States’ relatively poor record of 
participation in international agreements is highlighted. Participation is evaluated by 
determining the United States’ ratification status as a party to the respective convention or 
agreement, and its subsequent actions to meet the standards of the agreement. As 
participation in multilateral efforts may contribute to future efforts to meet foreign policy 
goals, this paper includes an analysis of actions through both a liberal and constructivist 
paradigm. Through these two theories of international relations, the United States’ clear 
preference for unilateral action warrants reconsideration of current engagement in global 
efforts in the interest of achieving future foreign policy goals. Finally, this paper concludes 
with potential motivations for the U.S. to engage in more active participation in multilateral 
agreements on biodiversity loss. 
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II. International efforts to address biodiversity loss 
“Biodiversity is a cornerstone of developed and developing economies. 
Without healthy concentrations of biodiversity, livelihoods, ecosystem 
services, natural habitats, and food security can be severely compromised.” 
—Secretariat  for the Convention on Biological Diversity2 
 
“The Earth’s biological resources are vital to humanity’s economic and 
social development. As a result, there is a growing recognition that biological 
diversity is a global asset of tremendous value to present and future 
generations. At the same time, the threat to species and ecosystems has never 
been so great as it is today. Species extinction caused by human activities 
continues at an alarming rate.”–Convention on Biological Diversity3 
 
 
 Biodiversity loss is a global issue. Although it is more prevalent in some regions 
relative to others, the loss of biodiversity due to human activities has no regard for arbitrary 
boundaries of countries or developmental status. Rather, biodiversity loss is propelled by 
fundamentally global phenomena, such as transboundary climate change, degradation of 
habitats, and overexploitation. Scientific analysis continues to show compromised 
biospheres, and subsequent biodiversity loss throughout the globe (Newbold et al. 2016). 
Although it continues at unparalleled rates, the global community has recognized biodiversity 
loss, and continues to evaluate its progression while simultaneously attempting to stymie its 
advancement. Thus, there are several essential agreements on biodiversity loss that work to 
regulate and protect vital resources. In this paper, the Ramsar Convention, the Convention on 
                                                 
2Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 2014. Global Biodiversity Outlook 4. Montreal, Canada. 
Pg. 7. 
3Convention on Biological Diversity. 2016. “History of the Convention.” Accessed September 1, 
https://www.cbd.int/history/. 
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International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
(SCPOP) are evaluated. For an overview of the purpose and year each respective agreement 
was opened for state signature, see Table 1. This section presents the general state of global 
biodiversity, international actors addressing biodiversity, and the subsequent biodiversity 
agreements established in chronological order of adoption year to establish a background on 
international recognition, and subsequent efforts to address, global biodiversity loss. 
 
Table 1. Overview of Treaties on Biodiversity Loss or Associated Drivers 
Treaty Substance Year Adopted 
Ramsar 
Convention 
Recognizes the importance of wetlands for ecosystem 
services, and aims to prevent their further degradation 
through conservation and sustainable use of designated 
sites 
1971 
CITES Regulates international trade of plant and animal 
specimens through management and scientific 
assessment to prevent their endangerment or extinction 
1973 
MARPOL Aims to prevent the pollution of the marine environment 
from both operational and accidental operations of 
shipping through regulation of vessels 
1973 
UNCLOS Acknowledges the overexploitation of the marine 
environment, and establishes regulations to ensure the 
sustainable use of the ocean and its resources 
1982 
CBD Recognizes humans as a global threat to biodiversity, and 
aims to establish a legal instrument for the sustainable 
use and conservation of biological diversity 
1992 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that establishes an 
enforcement measure in the aim of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions 
1997 
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UNCCD Aims to prevent and reverse desertification through 
national programs supported by international cooperation 
1994 
SCPOP Acknowledges the negative consequences of persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs), and provides for the 
elimination of known POPs and the identification and 
elimination of other POPs 
2001 
 
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature has continually compiled a 
list of the state of threatened species across the globe for the past fifty years. Known as the 
Red List of Threatened Species, it is “widely recognized as the most comprehensive, 
objective global approach for evaluating the conservation status of plant and animal species” 
(International Union 2016, “About”). This list provides an assessment of the relatively 
understudied topic and quantification of biodiversity loss. Although the Red List currently 
recognizes 23,892 of 82,845 evaluated species as threatened, the estimated total number of 
species, many of which have not yet been discovered, is between 3 and 100 million (May 
2010). While scientists have reached a general consensus that “humans have changed 
ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period of time in human 
history” that “has resulted in a substantial and largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life 
on Earth,” it has been a generally under-researched and complex issue to understand 
(Millenium 2005). Thus, there is the possibility that species loss is occurring at even faster 
rates than currently believed, and that valuable and critical species not yet discovered are 
already being lost. To develop more certainty on the issue, several other organizations are 
working to quantify levels of biodiversity loss and ecosystem changes. Several key examples 
include the Millennium Assessment by the World Resources Institute, the Global 
Biodiversity Outlook for the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Global 
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Environmental Outlook by the United Nations Environment Program (Millennium 2005, 
Secretariat of the Convention 2014, United Nations Environment 2016).  
 Following the global recognition of biodiversity loss and understanding that it would 
only accelerate without intervention, leaders began to have meetings for state cooperation in 
the interest of protecting the environment. Although there have been other actors addressing 
irreparable biodiversity loss, such as significant international NGOs including the World 
Wildlife Fund and Conservation International, cooperation among governmental actors is 
integral to widespread solutions with longevity and enforceability (Collins 2013). The United 
Nations serves as a key intergovernmental actor for that purpose. As arguably the foremost 
intergovernmental institution, the United Nations has recognized environmental issues since 
its inception with the establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1945. This body then assisted in the establishment of 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1948. Since its conception, 
the IUCN has combined both government and civil society actors for the betterment of 
“human progress, economic development, and nature conservation” with a direct focus and 
dedication to “species survival, environmental law, protected areas, social and economic 
policy, ecosystem management, and education and development” (International Union 2016, 
“Overview”). 
 The United Nations further advocated for the health of the global environment 
through the creation of the United Nations Environment Program in 1972. This body has 
been responsible for a significant and invaluable contribution to the betterment of the 
environment, promoting scientific assessment and multilateral action across a broad range of 
issues. Further, advocating for the spectrum of betterment for environmental issues, including 
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climate change, ecosystem management, resource efficiency, and chemicals and waste, the 
work of the UNEP is important for a systems thinking approach, recognizing the effects that 
each factor has on other factors and the system as a whole (Sterling et al. 2010). Notably, the 
UNEP has also recognized biodiversity loss explicitly, frequently publishing and updating 
several reports on biodiversity trends, and promoting the goals presented in prominent 
international agreements (United Nations Environment 2014). Most important, the UNEP 
acts as an intermediate between state governments. Without the initial catalysts this robust 
body creates and its promotion of multilateral action, arguably many initiatives, conventions, 
and agreements concerning biodiversity loss may not have been possible (Desai 2006). 
 Although it is often a drawn-out process, establishing international environmental 
agreements is frequently the most effective stand-alone method for organizing international 
standards and commitments to an issue. While the process of creating and implementing 
international agreements is complex, it can be understood in several critical steps. For 
instance, the process of creating agreements begins with the global recognition of an issue 
that would benefit from international action, like biodiversity loss. Often, the issue is raised 
before a body of international representatives, such as a United Nations conference, and an 
instrument for addressing the issue is explicitly requested. Next, a text is drafted which 
outlines the issue and subsequent measures states should, or must, take to address the 
respective issue. This stage is often lengthy, including time for studies to be carried out or 
analyzed, the provisions included in the document to be delineated, and language to be made 
precise and clear. Upon the preparation of an initial draft, states involved in the agreement 
negotiate the terms of the text, with the intention of reaching a point in which states will 
concede to the agreement while maintaining effective solutions. Finally, if a level of satisfice 
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is reached, the text is then opened for signature. By signing an agreement, a state expresses 
the intention to comply. However, this does not mean the state is bound to the terms of the 
agreement. Rather, the state must be granted approval under its respective national 
procedures before it formally ratifies the agreement, and becomes bound to its terms. In the 
United States, the Senate holds the responsibility of ratification of international treaties. 
Agreements typically require a certain number of states to ratify an agreement before it 
“enters into force,” and becomes part of international governance. Once a state has ratified an 
agreement, it becomes a party member to that particular text and officially enters into 
internationally cooperative efforts to address a given issue. 
 Often, international agreements are voluntary, being without compliance measures. 
This implies that states can choose to engage in or disregard environmental protection at their 
own discretion. While there are certainly attributes to voluntary agreements, they ultimately 
lack critical enforceability to ensure long-lasting solutions. In contrast, treaties are a form of 
international agreements that are legally binding, having some enforcement instrument to 
ensure states comply with obligations to the agreement. Legally binding treaties compose 
international law to which states are compelled to abide to, and thus are the focus of this 
paper. Although these are certainly the most effective forms of international agreements, they 
require extensive international cooperation to achieve a meaningful number of ratifying 
parties. This occurs both in the creation of the text, the commitment of states to enter into 
binding terms and pursue national ratification, and the creation of institutions for monitoring 
and enforcement measures. That aside, treaties are arguably an essential component for the 
protection of the Earth’s biodiversity. However, as stated by one of the most directly-related 
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agreements on biodiversity loss, the Convention on Biological Diversity, “success depends 
on the combined efforts of the world’s nations” (Secretariat of the Convention 2000). 
 Precedence for international conventions on conservation efforts was established with 
the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, also referred to as the Ramsar 
Convention. In the 1960s, the global community began to note the productivity and diverse 
nature of wetlands present across the globe. However, they simultaneously recognized that 
wetlands were rapidly being “degraded and converted to other uses.” Thus, the Contracting 
Parties of the Ramsar Convention agreed to commit to: “work towards the wise use of all 
their wetlands, designate suitable wetlands for the… (‘Ramsar List’) and to ensure their 
effective management, and to cooperate internationally on transboundary wetlands, shared 
wetland systems, and shared species” (Ramsar Convention 2014, “Ramsar”). The Ramsar 
Convention was signed in 1971, and entered into force in 1975. Today, there are 162 parties 
committed to this effort. Although the major success of the Convention is in its concerted 
effort to preserve vital wetlands, ecosystems diverse with biodiversity and essential for the 
function of many ecosystem services, it is also important to recognize the precedence for 
international cooperation concerning an environmental issue set forth in the text. As stated by 
the Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention, “By setting international standards for wetland 
conservation and providing a forum for discussing global wetland issues, the Convention 
enables Contracting Parties to share information on wetlands and address issues together” 
(Ramsar Convention 2014, “International”). Overall, the Ramsar Convention is considered a 
success. Although it recognizes that the disappearance of wetlands is still a pressing issue, 
analysis shows that more wetlands would have been lost without the Convention than have 
been with it (Ramsar Convention 2014, “Wetlands,” United Nations Environment 2009). 
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Further, once established, this precedent could then be extrapolated, as a framework for 
international cooperation for the full spectrum of environmental issues, namely the loss of 
biodiversity and its contributing factors. 
 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora is the first example of a significant multilateral effort to protect species. When the 
concept of a treaty specifically for the conservation of species was raised, it was relatively 
novel. However, upon further investigation of the issue, the complexity of the drivers of 
biodiversity loss combined with the cross-border trade between countries made it apparent 
that international cooperation would be necessary to preserve internationally valued natural 
resources. The text and agreement on the document represents years of discussion between 
respective state leaders.  Negotiations began in 1963 after a meeting between members of the 
IUCN. After careful discussion and construction of a workable compromise, the text was 
agreed upon by the representatives of 80 countries in 1973, and entered into force in 1975 
(Convention on International 2016, “What”). Since, CITES has become one of the most 
entered-into legally binding treaties on the topic, today having 182 party members. The core 
purpose of CITES is to ensure “Trade in specimens of these [threatened] species must be 
subject to particularly strict regulation in order not to endanger further their survival and 
must only be authorized in exceptional circumstances” (Convention 1973). Although there 
are certainly some flaws in the design and operation of the text, the drafters of CITES 
deserve considerable credit for being among the first of their kind to make a formal provision 
for a regulatory program on species trade. That aside, several issues have been difficult to 
overcome that have hindered the effectiveness of the document. These include: the variation 
in domestic application and enforcement of legislation to conform to the Convention; the 
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scope being limited to international trade without consideration of domestic occurrences; 
illegal trade which is relatively infeasible to report under the CITES database, and the 
understanding that not all countries are party to the Convention, and thus can engage freely in 
operations to the further detriment of threatened species (International Union 2000). 
Currently, there are about 5,600 species of animals and 30,000 species of plants recognized 
by CITES (Convention on International 2016, Appendices). 
 Oceans cover 70% of the planet, and house a “tremendous wealth of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services” within their depths (Convention on Biological 2010, Marine). 
Globalization and human development has not neglected to adversely affect marine 
environments its development pursuit, leaving oceans in need of the same attention to 
protection and preservation as land environments. The International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78) is thus an important multilateral 
environmental agreement for previously underrepresented ecosystems. As the “main 
international convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships 
from operational or accidental causes,” it is integral in the protection of marine biodiversity 
from harmful pollutants (International Maritime 2016, International). Prior to the 1973 
Convention, wastes like chemicals, plastics, and oils were discharged freely from thousands 
of ships. Shipping standards and discharge holding requirements were thus formally declared 
by the Convention, and are still predominantly what protects the bulk of the international 
waters from harmful substances. Today, it is understood that pollutants are a main driver of 
biodiversity loss, both degrading habitats as well as potentially killing marine life in direct 
contact with certain pollutants like plastic debris (California 2016). In 1978, several tanker 
accidents prompted a protocol to the original Convention text, both of which entered into 
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force that same year. Today, the Convention has 157 party members. Although standard 
compliance and worldwide enforcement has proved difficult at times, and accidental spills do 
still occur, several novel concepts introduced by the Convention have helped to prevent a 
significant amount of pollution that would have otherwise continued. These include double 
hull and bottom requirements for oil tankers that have proved less likely to accidentally 
discharge oil (Nauke 1992). Thus, the Convention has overall been deemed a success, having 
“been instrumental in the continuous decline of accidental oil pollution that has taken place 
over the last 30 years,” in addition to operational pollution (International Maritime 2016, 
“Marpol”). 
 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) similarly works to 
protect the invaluable biological resources in oceans. As a wealth of resources coveted across 
the globe, including minerals, oil, and fish, oceans were being exploited at unparalleled rates, 
causing disputes among countries and catalyzing a realization that regulations of the ocean’s 
resources was necessary. Thus, the United Nations hosted the Conference on the Law of the 
Sea in 1973, with the intention of writing a comprehensive treaty for the protection of the 
resources beneath the water. The provisions in the treaty are extensive: “In short, the 
Convention is an unprecedented attempt by the international community to regulate all 
aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean, and thus bring a stable order to 
mankind’s very source of life” (Division 1998). UNCLOS was signed in 1982, and entered 
into force in 1994. Today, UNCLOS has 168 member parties (Division 2016). Unfortunately, 
UNCLOS has persistently been criticized for its ineffectiveness. Criticisms include a lack of 
compliance and subsequent enforcement of provisions and a lack of governance, meaning 
that the sheer expanse of the seas has left them largely unprotected despite the agreement 
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(Churchill 2012, Nathan 2016). Further, there are still concerns that “the health of the 
world’s oceans is in serious decline,” and that its precious resources continue to be exploited 
in pursuit of financial gain (Sobel et al. 2007). 
Arguably, the most important international agreement for the protection of 
biodiversity specifically is the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Following the 
publication of the World Commission on Environment and Development’s “Our Common 
Future,” it was determined that the global community must take efforts to “become less 
ecologically destructive.” Thus, the UNEP convened a group of experts to “explore the need 
for an international convention on biological diversity” in 1988 (Secretariat of the 
Convention 2000). Quickly, the group determined the necessity for international action to 
protect global biodiversity, and drafted the pivotal Biodiversity Convention text. It was 
presented at the historic “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro to the “largest-ever” meeting on 
the international environment, entering into history as one of the three agreements intended 
to usher in a new philosophy of development and sustainable use. As a relatively novel 
undertaking,  
“it stands as a landmark in international law. It recognizes—for the first time—that 
conservation of biological diversity is a ‘common concern of humankind’… past 
conservation efforts were aimed at protecting particular species and habitats, the 
Convention recognizes that ecosystems, species and genes must be used for the 
benefit of humans. However, this should be done in a way and at a rate that does not 
lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity” (Secretariat of the Convention 
2000). 
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The main objectives of the CBD are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable 
use of the components of biological diversity, and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. However, there are a broad scope 
of other important treaty commitments; these include establishing protected areas, 
rehabilitating degraded ecosystems, aiding in the recovery of threatened species, preventing 
and managing invasive species, and reporting on how respective countries are meeting the 
biodiversity goals. The CBD was formally signed in 1992, and entered into force in 1993. 
Today, the Convention has 196 member parties; this includes all United Nations member 
states, with the exception of the United States (Convention on Biological 2016, “List of 
Parties”). 
 Further, the CBD has two significant protocols, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
and the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, which have provided substantial protection for 
biodiversity in their own right. The Cartagena Protocol addresses “the potential risks posed 
by living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology,” following the spirit of 
the precautionary principle (Convention on Biological 2016, “Protocol” Convention on 
Biological 2000). This is significant in its trigger of a risk adverse management style that 
aims to preemptively regulate a potential issue or entity, specifically biotechnology advances, 
even before a proven issue has been created. Prior to the Rio Conference, environmental 
agreements had been reactive rather than proactive in managing environmental issues. 
Considering the nature of environmental issues, responding before costly degradation occurs 
is particularly important, and reaffirming the precedence created by the CBD has helped 
solidify that critical aspect of international environmental policy (Cooney 2004). The 
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Protocol was adopted in 2000, and entered into force in 2003. The Nagoya Protocol 
supplements the CBD through a framework for implementation of the “fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” objective, ensuring 
benefit-sharing in instances when genetic resources become transboundary and standard 
conditions for subsequent access to those genetic resources (Convention on Biological 2010, 
Nagoya). Thus, the Protocol “creates incentives to conserve and sustainably use genetic 
resources and therefore enhances the contribution of biodiversity to development and well-
being” (Convention on Biological 2016, “Nagoya”). The Nagoya Protocol was adopted in 
2010, and entered into force in 2014.  The Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols have 170 and 78 
member parties, respectively (Convention on Biological 2016, “List”). 
 Although the CBD remains the foremost global attempt to reduce the loss of 
biodiversity, it has many critics, and has continually failed to meet its respective targets. 
Regrettably, the basis and continued relevance of the agreement originates from the 
understanding that “we continue to lose biodiversity at an unprecedented rate” (Convention 
2016). Thus, the need for wholehearted commitment to targets in the CBD is essential to a 
future with healthy biodiversity and its invaluable ecosystem services. Unfortunately, many 
of the issues noted with the CBD is a lack of formal obligations because states simply are 
unwilling to accept them (Tollefson and Gilbert 2012). Undoubtedly, the drivers of 
biodiversity loss, including habitat loss and climate change, stem from activities that are 
otherwise economically beneficial to society. Those activities allow for industrialization, 
increased agricultural output, and overall more affluent societies. Thus, accepting compliance 
obligations that infringe on the sovereignty of actions within one’s one borders, albeit 
activities that harm biological resources, results in hesitance to voluntarily concede some 
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amount of economic power today for the protection of biodiversity in the future. However, 
there are also a myriad of other issues with the agreement that are likely to hinder its 
effectiveness into the future. These include a lack of national observational infrastructure to 
detect changes in the health of biodiversity, thus relying heavily on outside sources such as 
the IUCN’s Red List for data on both local and global biodiversity. Further, the Convention 
has an overall lack of funding, which starkly cripples the CBD’s ability to progress 
(Tollefson and Gilbert 2012). Although new objectives have been created, the 2020 Aichi 
Targets, it is becoming increasingly doubtful they will be met as the deadline looms closer as 
many participants belie pointed efforts to achieve the objectives (Vaughan 2014). That aside, 
the CBD continues to be a sign of hope for many, as the first concerted attempt to lessen the 
human impacts on crucial biodiversity. 
 In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
was signed, becoming one of the three conventions presented at the Rio Conference. For the 
first time, climate change was enshrined as a globally salient issue. Having “near-universal 
membership” of 197 member parties today, the UNFCCC signified the understanding that 
human actions will continue to cause irreparable deterioration of the planet’s environment 
without a stabilization of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere (United 
Nations 1992). While this was a pivotal step in the recognition of climate change, it 
unfortunately did not contain legally binding emissions targets, and the concentration of 
GHGs continued to increase. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted as an enforcement 
measure in 1997, armed with internationally binding emission reduction targets. These 
targets were decided under the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle, 
motivated by the understanding that “developed countries are principally responsible for the 
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current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of 
industrial activity,” and should accept more significant responsibility for lowering emissions 
(United Nations Framework 2016, “Kyoto”). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, 
and currently has 192 member parties. Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol has been plagued 
by a number of issues, and was unable to meet emissions reductions targets in its first 
commitment period (2008-2012) (Schiermeier 2012). Thus, a second commitment period 
began in 2012 under the Doha Amendment (United Nations Framework 2012). Once again, 
the Protocol proved disappointing as more states chose not to agree to commitments, and it 
appears the targets will fail to be met once again as the end of the commitment period in 
2020 draws near. Issues include an explicit attempt to burden more industrialized states with 
reducing emissions and aid less industrialized states with development aid while less 
industrialized states had little to no formal emissions obligations. However, as those less 
industrialized states did accelerate in emissions, the document remained static, aiding in the 
growth of global emissions. In addition, several top emitters, like Canada and the United 
States, excused themselves from the agreement and continued to emit unabated. Without the 
regulation of some of the most industrialized states with a disproportional share of global 
emissions, the agreement is unable to achieve an ideal scenario, and is likely to continually 
fail objectives until the major economic majors agree to lower emissions as well (Tollefson 
and Gilbert 2012). The Doha Amendment has not yet entered into force, having the 
acceptance of only 66 states of the required 144 (United Nations Framework 2016, “Doha”). 
Although it is accepted that climate change is a major driver of biodiversity loss, there is 
currently a lack of international cooperation for climate change action. However, scientific 
consensus on climate change is undeniable, and hope for international cooperation still exists, 
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largely in the Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework 2015). On November 4, 2016, 
this agreement reached the prerequisite number of countries to formally enter into force, with 
at least 55 parties representing 55% of global GHG emissions having signed the 2015 text 
(United Nations Framework 2016, “Paris”). 
 The final convention originating from the Rio Conference is the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). Desertification refers to the process 
whereby land that was once arable becomes desert. Ultimately, it is one of the most severe 
forms of habitat degradation. Areas experiencing desertification also tend to be some of the 
most vulnerable ecosystems, and loss of essential biodiversity and ecosystem services can 
affect significant areas of land in over one hundred countries, as well as nearly one billion 
lives (Secretariat of the United). Although the issue of desertification had been 
internationally recognized previously at the United Nations Conference on Desertification in 
1977, prior to the Rio Conference it was declared that the issue had only intensified. Thus, 
the text of the UNCCD was directly recommended at the Rio Conference as part of the 
Agenda 21. It was signed in 1994, entered into force in 1996, and today has near-universal 
membership at 195 member parties. While it should be recognized that the UNCCD has 
managed to create mechanisms and institutions to tackle a complex issue, the United Nations 
does recognize the challenges and constraints to meeting the goals. These include: high 
poverty levels in areas most vulnerable to desertification, climate variability, weak 
institutional capacity and enforcement of policies, and inadequate funding for the programs 
(Bassett and Talafre 2003, Economic 2007). 
 Following the historic Rio Conference and its associated agreements, international 
recognition of environmental issues continued to grow, and scientific assessments of 
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environmental health were likewise more frequent. Thus, discussion and subsequent 
agreements have become more recurrent in recent years. The Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (SCPOP) is an example of this. Persistent organic pollutants 
(POPs), materials that resist typical degradation and “remain intact in the environment for 
long periods,” were recognized by the UNEP as a significant threat to both human health and 
the environment in 1995. These substances become “widely distributed 
geographically…[and] no one government acting alone can protect its citizens or its 
environment” from the effects of accumulation of POPs.” Effects associated with POPs are 
some of the most severe consequences associated with pollutants. These include: cancers, 
birth defects, dysfunctional immune and reproductive systems, and damaged nervous systems 
(Stockholm 2016). After further scientific assessment of POPs, twelve were included in the 
draft of the Convention, with the objective of protecting human health and the environment 
from harmful effects through the prohibition and elimination of certain POPs and the 
restriction of others. The POP was signed in 2001, and entered into force in 2004. Today, 
there are 180 member parties. Overall, the SCPOP has been deemed a success. Since its 
original draft, several more POPs have been added and regulated as science and knowledge 
on the issue progresses. However, there are recognized discrepancies of effectiveness and 
participation across the spectrum of countries to the Convention. Thus, the Convention notes 
persistence as a key factor to success moving forward (Secretariat of the Stockholm 2012). 
 Each of the aforementioned international conventions and agreements are undeniably 
integral to the foundation of international cooperation, multilateral strategies for action, and 
the protection of the environment and its biodiversity. As such, the agreements discussed 
comprise the basis for analyzing state participation in international biodiversity agreements. 
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That aside, it is important to recognize that there are a multitude of other environmental 
agreements that also touch on environmental protection and preservation that are important 
for the betterment of biodiversity. For more information on such agreements that are notable 
, but do not currently meet the aforementioned requirements to be discussed in this paper, see 
Appendix, Table 3. 
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III. U.S. participation in international agreements on biodiversity loss  
“The State Department, along with other agencies, is working to protect 
biological diversity, particularly through negotiations, agreements, and 
initiatives to conserve forests, wetlands, and coral reefs—ecosystems all rich 
in biological diversity and critical for sustaining human life.”—The U.S. 
Department of State4 
“Yet, America’s unwillingness to embrace a flawed treaty should not be read 
by our friends and allies as any abdication of responsibility. To the contrary, 
my administration is committed to a leadership role on the issue of climate 
change.”—President George W. Bush5 
 
 The United States, from the “shot heard around the world” that signaled its 
independence and entry into the international community as a sovereign power, has 
maintained a role as a major player in international relations unrivaled by most due to its 
robust size and power. While its foreign policy on many issue topics has varied throughout 
the decades, it has typically maintained a leadership capacity in international negotiations. 
However, that has not often been the case for environmental issues. Although “Americans 
have come to realize that adverse environmental changes beyond their borders can threaten 
environmental protection efforts at home or even dwarf domestic environmental problems in 
their proportions and consequences,” the United States has recently restrained from engaging 
in an active role on global environmental issues (Harris 2001, 3). Rather, the United States’ 
participation in environmental agreements has become an “elephant in the room,” as one of 
                                                 
4 The U.S. Department of State. 2001. “Environmental Diplomacy.” Accessed September 8, 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/earth.html#gore. 
5 The U.S. Department of State. 2001. “Remarks by President Bush on Global Climate Change.” Accessed 
September 8, http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/4149.htm. 
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the largest states to repeatedly refrain from, or even abandon, international environmental 
agreements (Brunnee 2004). Thus, this section provides an assessment of the United States’ 
participation via ratification status and subsequent compliance measures in regards to the 
aforementioned biodiversity agreements in chronological order of adoption year. The 
ratification trend of the United States is compared to other states via states by categories 
under human development rankings. Overall, the United States exhibits a lack of 
participation in agreement relative to that of other states, especially in regards to other ‘very 
high’ human development states. 
 The Ramsar Convention is the first significant example of restrained participation by 
the United States in binding environmental agreements. Although the United States did sign 
and ratify the agreement, it did not complete the domestic ratification process until 1986, 
eleven years after the Ramsar Convention met the minimum number of ratifications to enter 
into force. Notably, the United States ratified around the same general time as other states 
with ‘very high’ human development status, indicating that the slow start was not unique to 
the United States. In fact, the most developed states were the leaders in average year of 
individual ratification, having an average year of entry into force eight years before states 
with high human development status, and ten before states with medium or low human 
development status. The relative speed of the U.S’s ratification process occurred during the 
Reagan administration. Notably, this administration benefitted from the recent creation of 
agencies and infrastructure supported by a powerful domestic environmental movement and 
responsive administrations that allowed for relative ease and little drastic change to meet 
compliance standards. However, it is important to note that the United States nonetheless 
ratified after the states of Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy (Ramsar 
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Convention 2016, “Country”). Table 2 displays the breakdown of percentage of successful 
individual state ratification of discussed agreements and subsequent average year of 
individual entry into force by states in categories of human development levels as designated 
by the Human Development Index. Regardless of time to ratification, the State Department 
states that it still “actively supports the Ramsar Convention,” and this is largely true (U.S. 
2001). Domestically, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) operates the 
Wetlands Protection and Restoration program to ensure compliance with the Ramsar 
Convention. This program monitors and assesses the health of wetlands, attempts to restore 
degraded wetlands, and provides funding for the better the capacity of local actors to 
“increase the quantity and quality of wetlands in the U.S.” (Environmental 2016, 
“Wetlands”). Further, while the United States does host thirty-eight sites designated as 
“Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Sites),” it should be noted that wetlands in 
the U.S. are still under threat. Although there have been periods of success to restore the 
nearly 50% of lost wetlands in the continental U.S., many areas have continued to experience 
decline (Ramsar Convention 2016, “United,” Dahl 2011). Further, considering the sheer size 
of the United States, it is reasonable to assume it would have at least as many, if not more, 
protected wetland areas than territorially smaller developed states. However, this is not 
necessarily the case. For example, France has forty-four, Italy has fifty-two, and the United 
Kingdom has 170 sites.  
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Table 2. Ratification and Average Year of Entry into Force of Biodiversity-Biodiversity 
Driver Agreements 
HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
CATEGORY 
TREATY U.S. TREATY 
STATUS 
  
 RAMSAR CONVENTION  
 
NUMBER OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
AVERAGE YEAR 
OF INDIVIDUAL 
STATE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE RATIFIED 
1986 
 VERY HIGH 44 90% 1987 
HIGH 50  89% 1995 
MEDIUM 34  87% 1997 
LOW 37 84% 1997 
    
 CITES  
 
NUMBER OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
AVERAGE YEAR 
OF INDIVIDUAL 
STATE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE RATIFIED 
1975 VERY HIGH 47  96% 1987 
HIGH 55  98% 1991 
MEDIUM 34  87% 1989 
LOW 42  95% 1987 
    
 MARPOL  
 
NUMBER OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
AVERAGE YEAR 
OF INDIVIDUAL 
STATE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE RATIFIED 
1983 VERY HIGH 45  92% 1990 
HIGH 49  88% 1995 
MEDIUM 27  71% 1997 
LOW 22  50% 1998 
    
 UNCLOS  
 
NUMBER OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
AVERAGE YEAR 
OF INDIVIDUAL 
STATE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE 
SIGNED 
1994 
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VERY HIGH 43  88% 1997 
HIGH 49  88% 1995 
MEDIUM 31  79% 1995 
LOW 37  84% 1994 
    
 CBD  
 
NUMBER OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
AVERAGE YEAR 
OF INDIVIDUAL 
STATE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE SIGNED 
1993 VERY HIGH 47  96% 1996 
HIGH 56  100% 1995 
MEDIUM 39  100% 1996 
LOW 44  100% 1996 
    
 KYOTO PROTOCOL  
 
NUMBER OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
AVERAGE YEAR 
OF INDIVIDUAL 
STATE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE SIGNED 
1998 VERY HIGH 46 94% 2005 
HIGH 56  100% 2005 
MEDIUM 38  97% 2006 
LOW 43  98% 2006 
    
 UNCCD  
 
NUMBER OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
AVERAGE YEAR 
OF INDIVIDUAL 
STATE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE RATIFIED 
2000 VERY HIGH 47  96% 1999 
HIGH 55  98% 1998 
MEDIUM 36  92% 1998 
LOW 44  100% 1997 
    
 SCPOP  
 
NUMBER OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
PERCENTAGE OF 
STATE 
RATIFICATION 
BY HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
AVERAGE YEAR 
OF INDIVIDUAL 
STATE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE 
SIGNED 
2001 
VERY HIGH 42  86% 2005 
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HIGH 54  96% 2006 
MEDIUM 33  85% 2006 
LOW 42  95% 2006 
Sources: Human Development Index Ranking 2015, Ratification data from Ramsar Convention, CITES, MARPOL, 
UNCLOS, CBD, Kyoto Protocol, UNCCD, SCPOP 
 
 
 Although the United States has a consistent record of lackluster participation in many 
international environmental agreements, CITES acts as a prime example of active U.S. 
participation and commitment to outcomes of multilateral negotiations. The United States 
was among the first to sign and ratify the agreement, alongside 96% of states with ‘very 
high’ human development status (Convention on International 2016, “List”). Per the 
provisions in CITES, each state must create a Management and Scientific Authority to ensure 
legal trade and determine when trade of a species would become detrimental. This is largely 
handled by the Fish and Wildlife Service in the U.S, albeit with some assistance from other 
agencies, and it continues to pursue active enforcement of CITES through frequent 
implementation reports and action transparency (Fish 2015). Further, the United States 
passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to coincide with its engagement in CITES. 
Although the United States actively encouraged, participated in, and worked to enforce 
CITES, this is a relative anomaly in its overall performance in international environmental 
agreements. However, one should recognize that the ratification of CITES and the 
environmental movement in the United States occurred around the same time, coinciding 
under the Nixon Administration. Similar to other ratifications surrounding the time of the 
environmental movement, the popular support for environmental regulation and protection 
was a clear indicator to the Senate that ratification would be approved by the general 
constituency. Thus, CITES negotiations and Congress’s ratification were endorsed by an 
enthusiastic and supportive populous. It is then reasonable to believe that state leaders 
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choosing to participate in CITES and bolster it with the ESA expected their decisions to be 
popular and well received, as were the majority of environmental protection laws established 
and implemented at the time. That aside, it is clear from the general success of CITES and 
the United States’ active engagement with the agreement that the eager participation of the 
United States can be a significant contributor to the betterment of the state of the global 
environment and the health of its biodiversity. 
 The United States ratified the 1978 version of MARPOL in 1983, alongside many 
other party members, but prior to the average year of entry into force of all party members. 
Once again, this ratification occurred under the Reagan administration when awareness of 
environmental issues experienced heightened relevance in the United States. To meet 
compliance for the MARPOL annexes the United States is party to, the U.S. created the Act 
to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) the same year of MARPOL ratification. Much of the 
enforcement is designated to the United States Coast Guard (USCG), although the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has involvement with regulation processes 
(United States 2016, Environmental 2016, “Marpol”). While the U.S. has ratified the 
majority of annexes, I/II, III, V, and VI, it has notably not ratified Annex IV, which pertains 
to sewage discharge. However, the USCG states that it “has equivalent regulations for the 
treatment and discharge standards of shipboard sewage—the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, amended by the Clean Water Act and implemented by 33 USC 1251 and 33 CFR 159 
(United States 2016). Although there may be other provisions within the United States that 
currently meet the requirements of Annex IV, it is notable that the United States persistently 
resists ratification of all but one annex. Thus, while the United States does participate in 
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international governance through MARPOL, it nonetheless exercises a level restraint and a 
refusal participate fully. 
 Although the United States was involved in negotiations concerning UNCLOS, it has 
signed, but continuously failed to ratify it. Unlike decisions not to ratify a MARPOL annex 
due to a redundancy of environmental protection policy, there has been active and 
contentious debate and opposition from members of Congress concerning the ratification of 
UNCLOS, and it continues fervently today (Patrick 2012). Although President Clinton 
signed the document in 1994, he was met with a skeptical and unwilling Senate. Although 
there are a myriad of reasons why senators continue to block ratification, the dominant 
argument focuses on a loss of sovereignty in the seas for the United States, largely in the 
right to “accessibility to an abundant supply of oil and natural gas reserves” within its 
territory (Kelly 2012, Sobel et al. 2007). As with other nearly universally ratified agreements, 
the United States’ credibility in international maritime disputes has been called into question 
due to its lack of participation in UNCLOS, and is creating further tension to finally ratify the 
Convention (McDevitt 2015). 88% of countries with ‘very high’ and ‘high’ human 
development status have an average year of entry into force of around 1995, with nearly 
twenty years of cooperation and multilateral efforts to ensure environmental protection that 
the United States is voluntarily excluded from participation within. 
 As perhaps the most comprehensive and pertinent international convention on the 
global integrity of biodiversity, active participation from all countries is important for the 
effectiveness of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Although the United States was 
once praised for its enthusiastic response to CITES, the decline in domestic relevance of 
environmental protection coupled with the loss in momentum of the environmental 
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movement created a political context that was far less willing to engage in multilateral 
environmental agreements. Unsurprisingly, the participation of the United States in the CBD 
has been restrained, if not a complete refusal, to engage in cooperative efforts. Although the 
U.S. signed most agreements it had involvement with, regardless of ratification status, the 
United States refused to sign the CBD under the leadership of President Bush. Upon election, 
President Clinton immediately signed the CBD, but was unable to ratify it during his 
presidency. Today, the United States still has not ratified the CBD. This contrasts the near 
universal membership of the agreement, with 96% of ‘very high’ human development 
countries and the totality of all other states, which have now ratified and are participating in 
direct attention to the globe’s biodiversity loss. 
 When the UNFCCC was signed, it was believed that a philosophy on sustainable 
development and attention to environmental externalities had entered the international 
community. However, while the United States signed the UNFCCC, it did not do so with an 
altogether shifted paradigm on the priorities between economic development and preserving 
environmental integrity. As previously discussed, due to the lack of binding enforcement in 
the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was then opened for signature and ratification. While the 
United States signed the Kyoto Protocol under the Clinton administration in 1998, it has yet 
to ratify it (United Nations Framework 2016, “Kyoto Status”). This refusal is significant 
when considering the 94% of ‘very high’ and 100% of ‘high’ human development countries 
ratified the document over ten years ago. While one reason for restraint from the United 
States is the weight of burden on the most developed countries, rationalized by their history 
of GHG emissions, that same reasoning has clearly not deterred the majority of other 
developed states. Although the United States has implemented some domestic policies, such 
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as automobile and building efficiencies, emissions produced have far surpassed any 
efficiency attempts. In fact, the emissions of the United States increased two percent from 
1990 to 2013, even with calls for a drastic reduction from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (Environmental 2015, Inventory). Currently, “business-as-usual” 
scenarios in the United States are expected to show a significant increase in GHG emissions. 
As the United States is the largest per capita emitter of GHGs, its policies and subsequent 
enforcement commitment are pivotal for the severity of future global climate scenarios 
(Environmental 2015, Climate). 
 The UNCCD was signed by the United States, and subsequently ratified in 2000 
under the Clinton administration (Secretariat of the United 2014). This ratification was 
alongside the significant majority of other “very high” human development states. Although 
the ‘low’ and ‘medium’ human development levels ratified the document earlier, 96% and 
98% of ‘very high’ and ‘high’ development countries eventually ratified, and today there is a 
broad scope of states cooperating to address desertification. This ratification is especially 
notable considering the purpose of the UNCCD is largely beneficial to African countries that 
suffer the most from acute desertification. Often, the United States indicates a hesitance to 
engage in programs that require the funding of other countries without an overt benefit to the 
United States, and the ratification of the UNCCD represents an important exclusion from that 
general rule (Ivanova and Etsy 2004). This deviation from the U.S.’ general disengagement 
with multilateral environmental agreements should be recognized alongside the evident 
willingness of the Clinton administration to engage in global environmental efforts, clear 
from their signature of UNCLOS, the CBD, and the Kyoto Protocol. Notably, the most 
substantial compliance standards for the U.S. under the UNCCD are financial contributions, 
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not requiring the development of a “national action program” (Congress 2016). This 
contrasts with the alterations in state operations or emissions, essentially a concession of 
sovereignty, required by the treaties that failed the ratification process. Thus, overcoming 
political obstacles to ratify the UNCCD was relatively easier when considering the failed 
ratifications of other treaties under the Clinton administration. Biodiversity loss is an issue 
occurring globally, but it is important to recognize the areas that are most biodiverse-rich, 
and are likewise the most vulnerable countries to biodiversity loss. Thus, having the 
precedent of widespread cooperation under the UNCCD to address a driver of biodiversity 
loss that is largely beneficial to a certain region, but nonetheless requires international 
attention, is critical for the future of effective protection of global biodiversity in regions 
most adversely affected. 
 As another legally binding international agreement on a driver of biodiversity loss, 
the United States has yet to display a resounding shift in engagement with international law 
through engagement with the SCPOP. Rather, the United States signed the SCPOP under the 
Bush administration in 2001, but has yet to ratify the document (Stocholm 2016). This is 
relative to 86% of ‘very high’ and 96% of ‘high’ human development countries. While 
President Bush did sign the agreement, it was in the first several months of his presidency. 
The political context significantly altered following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the 
concern over environmental issues declined as a result (Gallup 2016). The United States has 
continued to show reluctance in ratifying the document for several reasons, including an 
unwillingness to eliminate select POPs recognized by the Convention, to provide funding and 
assistance to developing countries, and the overall reliance on the precautionary principle 
that is at the heart of the Convention (Brunnee 2004). As the most recent treaty on a driver of 
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biodiversity loss in force without the ratification of the United States, the SCPOP acts as the 
current precedent for the U.S.’s participation in international environmental agreements 
concerning biodiversity loss—an overall unwillingness to engage in multilateral efforts 
amidst active participation efforts from the preponderance of states in the international 
system. 
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IV. Domestic efforts to address biodiversity loss 
“Here in the United States we turn our rivers and streams into sewers and 
dumping-grounds, we pollute the air, we destroy forests, and exterminate 
fishes, birds and mammals…But at last it looks as if our people were 
awakening.” –President Theodore Roosevelt6 
 
 Since its independence, the United States has grown to be among the largest 
territorially immense and diverse states in the international system (Central 2016). As such, 
the United States possesses a substantial number of different ecoregions, geographic areas 
with distinct ecosystems, within its borders (Bailey 1980). This has made the United States 
home to rich biodiversity from coast to coast that is largely unrivaled elsewhere in the world. 
Studies of the United States have found a distribution of both biodiversity rich regions, as 
well as areas experiencing acute loss of biodiversity (Sabensan 2008, Dobson et al. 1997, 
Flather et al. 1998, Poudyal et al. 2016). Considering the United States’ overall lack of 
participation in international efforts to address biodiversity loss, it is reasonable to assume 
explanation for its restrained engagement is due to a general disregard, or lack of value, for 
biodiversity. However, as this section illustrates, the United States has recognized the loss of 
diversity within its borders, and has taken concerted efforts to regulate and protect its natural 
resources. Thus, although the efforts of the United States have been imperfect at times, the 
overall acknowledgement and attempt to prevent further degradation of biodiversity is clearly 
                                                 
6National Park Service. 2016. “Theodore Roosevelt and Conservation.” Accessed July 19,  
 https://www.nps.gov/thro/learn/historyculture/theodore-roosevelt-and-conservation.htm. 
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an inadequate explanation for the United States’ refusal to engage in multilateral agreements 
on biodiversity loss. 
The biodiversity of the United States has been cultivated through natural processes 
over millions of years, long before the borders of the United States were established and 
redrawn into the conventional fifty states, and is arguably among the most important parts of 
the nation’s living history. Some of the areas richest in biodiversity include Hawaii, Southern 
California, the southeastern coastal states, and southern Appalachia (Sabesan et al. 2008). 
Considering the myriad of ecoregions the United States sustains, coinciding with its large 
population and development levels, it is not surprising that it houses a number of critical 
biodiversity hotspots. These refer to areas with high amount of biodiversity at an 
irreplaceable level that are acutely threatened by human activities within its borders, pieces 
of that living history at risk of being lost forever (Myers et al. 2000, Stein 2002). The 
hotspots that are internationally recognized as being within the United States include the 
California Floristic Province, the Caribbean, and Polynesia/Micronesia (Myers et al. 2000). 
Although the physical number of hotspots may not appear significant or alarming when 
considering the breadth of the Earth’s mass, the level of endemism, referring to species being 
unique to a particular geographic area that will essentially be lost without swift and efficient 
intervention, is staggering, and a significant portion of that lies within the protection of the 
United States. 
 Although the human-driven actions that contribute to biodiversity loss are 
accelerating at a relatively unchecked rate in the U.S., there has been a growth of recognition 
over the trend recent years that fosters hope for positive intervention. This has come in a 
myriad of forms, among them being the rise of interest groups on environmental issues and 
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biodiversity loss specifically, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and government-
related action. Due to the wide array of methods through which humans can inadvertently 
create biodiversity loss, nearly all environmental interest groups and NGOs advocate for the 
betterment of one or more issue points with the potential to improve the state of biodiversity. 
Since the environmental movement and the proliferation of environmental legislation in the 
1970s, the influence of environmental groups in the United States has been noted repeatedly. 
While the success of environmental groups has oscillated since, interest groups and NGOs 
have continued to maintain some level of saliency with both the general public and 
policymakers (Kraft 2001). Examples of these groups are nearly countless, including the 
American Wilderness Coalition, Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife 
Federation, the National Resource Defense Council, the Nature Conservancy, and the World 
Wildlife Fund (Stein and Beckel 2006). These groups work to raise funds and mobilize 
members towards broad goals of a cleaner environment, protection of natural resources, and 
biodiversity conservation. Often, one of the primary goals of environmental advocates is to 
incite change within a government entity (Bosso and Guber 2005). This can aid in the 
longevity of environmental regulation and protection, with policies enshrined in public law 
and government-sponsored programs. Today, there are many examples of environmental 
policy, administrations, and programs established to regulate or prevent environmental 
degradation in the United States. 
 Considering the biodiversity of the United States is one of the country’s most 
precious and bountiful natural resources, the evolution of policy around it has been essential 
to prevent catastrophic degradation as the country developed and grew. Although statutes or 
programs for environmental health and protection were not particularly prevalent in 
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Congressional activity throughout much of U.S. history, the concept of conservation was 
symbolically taken on by the federal government with the establishment of the National Park 
Service (NPS) under the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. Believing that “It is also 
vandalism wantonly to destroy or to permit the destruction of what is beautiful in nature, 
whether it be a cliff, a forest, or a species of mammal or bird,” President Roosevelt helped 
establish precedent for the protection and conservation of natural resources on public land 
through the creation of several reserves, parks, and monuments encompassing thousands of 
acres (National Park 2016, “Theordore”). This precedent persistently evolved into the federal 
management and protection of land and resources today (Keiter 2016).  
 Although the environmental protection laws created during the early twentieth 
century were vital for the creation of protection precedent, and the subsequent present level 
of environmental regulation and preservation, much of that inertia stemmed off as the 
country continued to industrialize and prioritize development. While the early twentieth 
century acted as a kind of precursor to the environmental movement by establishing the first 
environmental protection laws under federal jurisdiction, the laws most commonly associated 
with the regulation and protection of the U.S. environment originated in the 1960s and 1970s. 
During this pivotal era, several factors coalesced to create an unprecedented environmental 
movement. Scientific knowledge on the state of environmental degradation became more 
prevalent and developed consensus, media coverage on environmental issues became more 
popular, a more affluent and activist-inclined culture emerged, and lawmakers who saw 
opportunities to pass widely favorable legislation converged to create a previously 
unprecedented window of opportunity for federal attention to the environment (Dunlap and 
Mertig 1992). The environmental decades “created the legal, political, and institutional 
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foundations of the nation’s environmental policies” (Harris 2001, 5). Moreover, the 
Environmental Protection Agency was established to ensure the regulations created were 
appropriately enforced for the betterment of the environment and human health (Rolf 2016). 
Arguably, although the legislation proved paramount for the future of environmental 
protection, the most meaningful aspect of the environmental movement was not in the simple 
legislative acts passed or the creation of federal agencies. Rather, it was a shift in societal 
perspective that allowed for the burst of Congressional action that became the most 
unprecedented aspects of the environmental movement. Once again, it was believed that this 
paradigm would persist and that the United States would prove a leader not only in 
technological advances, industrial feats, and economic prowess, but also in sustained 
attention to environmental health. As will be illustrated later, this held true for a period. 
However, level of environmental concern and importance once again diminished relative to 
other widespread issues. 
Considering the federal government currently holds ownership over approximately 
28% of the land of the United States, a substantial amount of biodiversity falls directly under 
the government’s jurisdiction of protection. The land is overseen by multiple federal 
agencies, including the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), 
the National Park Service in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Forest Service 
(FS) in the Department of Agriculture (DOA) (Vincent et al. 2014). Through a myriad of 
programs within each of those agencies, sustainable use of land and protection of biodiversity 
are unifying efforts towards the overall goal of environmental health for current and future 
generations. For example, the National Conservation Lands program is overseen by the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Under the term “conservation land,” 32 million acres 
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of diverse lands are further classified, notably with not all being equal in amount of human 
interference permitted. For example, the most actively managed lands to preserve habitat 
health and biodiversity maintenance are typically deemed “wilderness areas.” These lands 
were established by the Wilderness Act of 1964 as, “an area where the earth and its 
community of life are untrammeled by man,” to “provide long-term protection and 
conservation of Federal public lands” (Bureau 2012, “Wilderness”). Each of the four 
aforementioned agencies administers this preservation system to some degree, with the 
National Park Service holding the largest percentage of designated wilderness land (Vincent 
et al. 2001). While this acts as one example of government attempt to protect biodiversity, it 
is important to recognize the majority of wilderness lands lie in the Western states, excluding 
the biodiverse rich state of Hawaii. Initially believed by many environmental advocates to be 
the “first concerted federal effort” to preserve wild habitats and biodiversity, it has fallen 
short of many hopeful expectations (Scott 2004, 24). For example, environmental advocates 
quickly realized that the system of national parks and wilderness protection was in steep 
competition with a goal of tourism promotion and “comfortable access” for vehicles (Scott 
2004, 25, Monz et al. 2016). Although there is a value in citizens and tourists readily 
accessing the natural beauty and resources of the United States, it should be accompanied 
with the recognition that it can alter, and even harm, the livelihoods of those within the 
protected areas. Further, scientists have also expressed concern that the United States is, quite 
simply, not adequately protecting its biodiversity (Jenkins et al. 2015). Due to the “multiple 
use” concept imbedded within the majority of lands in the United States, society is permitted 
to utilize the lands and its biodiverse resources beyond conservation levels (Bureau 2012, 
“Bureau”). Notably, this allows the lands to be utilized for recreational, development, and 
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resource harvest, all of which harbor income and societal value for the land. However, the 
anthropogenic drivers discussed earlier are regulated, but not wholly prevented. As 
mentioned earlier, although much of the infrastructure necessary to ensure environmental 
preservation exists, the lack of consistent saliency of environmental issues suggests agencies 
will continue to operate in a way that allows for some level of environmental degradation in 
lieu of economic gain. 
That aside, due to the concentration of federal lands in the Western territory, much of 
the country’s biodiversity is within the confines of private land laws, and thus susceptible to 
the full-spectrum of harmful human actions. However, this does not mean the remainder of 
U.S. territory is open to unrestricted environmental degradation. Rather, there are an 
increasing number of laws that work to ensure a standard level of environmental quality. 
Examples of this include the infamous environmental movement laws of the 1970’s, 
including the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act. For an 
overview of important federal environmental laws in the United States, see Appendix, Table 
4. In regards to the protection of species diversity, the most significant Congressional action 
remains the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). 
Recognized as a significant issue during the environmental movement, the 
preservation of species in the United States was thought to be ensured through the passage of 
the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966. This statute provided “a means for listing 
native animal species as endangered,” albeit with relatively limited protection (Fish 2016). 
Quickly, it was recognized that the law had several significant flaws hindering the effective 
protection of biodiversity. Following CITES, the United States finally acknowledged the 
necessity of a more enforceable preservation strategy, and passed the Endangered Species 
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Act the same year of the 1973 CITES convention agreements. The ESA expresses explicit 
concern that many of the nation’s native plants and animals are in danger of becoming 
extinct, and thus the purpose is to “protect and recover imperiled species and the ecosystems 
upon which they depend (Endangered). In some spheres, the ESA is recognized as a “wild 
success” (Center 2016, Systematic, Center 2016, American). In others, there are critics who 
point to flaws in the implementation of the ESA. However, nearly all agree that the ESA has 
consistently been the United States’ “best tool for saving species,” regardless of any 
improvements that might be needed (Taylor et al. 2005, Greenwald et al. 2013). Many of the 
issues attributed to the ESA concern underfunding, creating a significant backlog at times 
and overworked and underpaid workers at others, as well as inflexibility. In addition, the 
ESA forces one to wait until species have reached the level of “endangered,” a point in which 
the species is already in severe peril, before many of the provisions in the Act are triggered. 
Further, the Act is a key example of a method of problem-solving prevalent in the United 
States—treating the symptoms rather than the cause. For example, it is well-publicized that 
polar bears are an endangered species in the United States. As an integral part of the food 
web in the regions they are found, it is highly important that polar bears do not go extinct, 
and this fact has been recognized by the ESA with their listing of the polar bear as an 
endangered species to be protected. However, the Act provides no strategy for alleviating the 
main driver of polar bear endangerment—melting sea ice and accelerating loss of habitat due 
to climate change (Greenwald et al. 2013). 
The United States has acknowledged the seriousness of biodiversity loss for some 
time, and has thus taken considerable measures to ensure there is adequate infrastructure and 
enforcement to regulate its use, and ensure its ultimate protection. Although there have 
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certainly been more active periods of environmental concern and action, there has 
nonetheless been a steady underpinning of environmental protection. Notably, the United 
States has exhibited a clear willingness to engage in unilateral action to preserve its national 
biodiversity. Thus, accounting for the United States’ participation behavior in multilateral 
efforts to address biodiversity loss with the simple reasoning that it holds little or no value for 
biodiversity is inadequate. Undoubtedly, the United States places value for some degree of 
biodiversity and protection, yet it continues to refuse engagement in international efforts. 
Essentially, while other state actors in the international system continue to develop shared 
values and relationships through participation in multilateral efforts, the United States is 
voluntarily refusing to engage in those efforts, not because of a disbelief in the rapid loss of 
biodiversity, but likely due to the inherent characteristics of multilateral agreements. 
According to liberal and constructivist paradigms, the United States is thus potentially 
inciting negative implications for its future influence and capacity to fulfill foreign policy 
goals. 
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V. Liberalism and Constructivism: the U.S. in the future  
“The question of when, if and how well national governments cooperate to 
address shared environmental problems, from climate change to biodiversity 
loss…is central to the relationship between international relations theory and 
the environment.” –Kate O’Neill7 
 
Biodiversity loss is a phenomenon that is occurring throughout the globe, irrespective 
of sovereign state lines or perceived levels of state power. Thus, addressing biodiversity loss 
effectively will require cooperation on the international level, occurring between sovereign 
state entities and without a higher body to require altruistic behavior towards environmental 
issues. Active state participation in international legally-binding environmental agreements is 
thus essential for the preservation of biodiversity, and the ecosystem services associated with 
its health that exist today. Clearly, disbelief or lack of concern about biodiversity loss is not 
an adequate explanation for the behavior of the United States considering its efforts to 
address biodiversity loss nationally. Thus, the United States’ lack of participation may 
instead be tied to the nature of international efforts to address biodiversity loss—through 
legally binding multilateral agreements with regulations on economically valued resources 
and a concession of some level of sovereignty for the global good. While there are certainly 
reasons for not participating in drawn-out and costly international agreements, there are also 
compelling motivations for states, including the U.S., to actively engage in international 
                                                 
7 O’Neill, Kate. 2013. The Environment and International Relations. Page 1. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, UK. 
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cooperation. This is addressed through international relations theories, designed to study the 
“relationships between or among the various states and other political entities of the world” 
(Smith and Malici 2012, 1-12). Thus, this section assesses the behavior of the United States 
and its participation with international biodiversity agreements through the liberal and 
constructivist theories of international relations. These theories are the most suitable for 
viewing an international system successful in cooperative efforts to stymie biodiversity loss, 
and thus present unique paradigms for understanding the potential ramifications of the United 
States’ current trend of international inaction. Further, as the shifts in distribution of power 
are believed to be moving away from U.S. hegemony and towards shared power, the United 
States is likely to be left without a history of sustained cooperation, and a precedence of 
positive cooperative efforts. Through this analysis, several important implications arise that 
suggest strategic motivations for the United States to begin active participation in present and 
future international efforts to address biodiversity loss. 
Within the international system, state actors are viewed as sovereign entities, 
maintaining the right to autonomy within their respective borders. In essence, states have the 
right to operate and create policy within their borders without interference from other state 
actors. This is an integral concept in international system due to the anarchical nature of the 
international system, referring to the lack of a “supreme authority,” or a coercive power over 
all states. Rather, state actors can implement policies and take actions within their state 
borders, largely without regard to other state actors or consequences to the global 
environment. For this reason, understanding the actions of state actors, such as the United 
States, and their subsequent levels of participation in international agreements can be 
instrumental in working towards effectual solutions to biodiversity loss. 
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Regarding the study of international relations, there are several theories that are 
employed to understand the relationships, and subsequent implications, of interaction 
between state actors. These include realism, liberalism, constructivism, and radical 
approaches like Marxism. Liberalism is one of those foremost theories. Although it is largely 
focused on issues of state security, with examples like the Democratic Peace theory to avoid 
warfare, it also speaks to the importance of cooperation as a critical aspect to maintaining 
peace and state security. In liberalism, key actors are the states, non-governmental groups 
such as the World Wildlife Federation, and international organizations, such as the United 
Nations and its extensions like the UNEP. Most important, liberalists view the international 
system as anarchical, without a governing body to coerce states towards altruistic outcomes. 
Thus, liberal scholars find value in interdependence among actors, potentially reaching a 
state of international society in which “various actors communicate…they consent to 
common rules and institutions and recognize common interests (Mingst 2004, 84-85).” 
Although this is often embedded in the concept of collective security, and can even be due to 
self-interested motives for states to cooperate, it can result in positive outcomes in the form 
of dialogue and problem solving on global issues, such as environmental issues. Moreover, 
“liberals view the international system as an arena and process for positive interactions” 
(Mingst 2004, 85). Reaching this level of sustained cooperation between states would 
significantly aid in nurturing the active global solutions necessary to stall or reverse an issue 
as widespread and complex as biodiversity loss. This negotiation and coordination occurs 
through multilateralism, and in the creation of agreements such as those mentioned earlier. In 
regards to issues of the global environment specifically,  
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“Liberals have typically seen the environmental issue as appropriate to the 
international agenda for the twenty-first century. Their broadened view of security, 
coupled with the credence given to the notion of an international system described as 
interdependent, perhaps one so interconnected as to be called an international society, 
makes environmental issues ripe for international action” (Mingst 2004, 94-295). 
 Constructivism is also a prominent international relations theory that offers a useful 
paradigm for cooperation between states. It has become more popular in recent years, and 
continues to offer differing and useful insights into the actions in the international system. 
Constructivism offers a unique approach in which “state behavior is shaped by elite beliefs, 
identities, and social norms,” and these are what shape foreign policy (Mingst 2004, 75). 
Additionally, the influence of civil society, with examples like the U.S.’s environmental 
movement, can help to shape norms and influence state behavior. In other words, “reality” in 
the international system is socially constructed. Thus, objective or material facts have little 
meaning until observers assign them a meaning, and those socially constructed meanings are 
then treated as “facts.” Constructivism gives attention to the roles of ideas and identities as 
major roles in foreign policy. Through an evaluation of constructed and transforming 
identities and values on various topics, including environmental issues like biodiversity loss, 
it can help decipher changes in state actions in global governance and international law. In 
regards to issues of the global environment specifically, 
“Constructivists, too, are comfortable with environmental issues as an arena for 
international action. Environmental issues bring out the salience of discourse. 
Constructivists are interested in how political and scientific elites define the problem 
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and how that definition changes over time and new ideas become rooted in their 
belief sets (Mingst 2004, 295).” 
 A state’s foreign policy refers to its respective strategies for interactions with other 
actors in the international system. Influences on a state’s general foreign policy can include 
institutions, domestic environment, and capacity. The domestic environment within a state, 
such as popular interests like the environmental movement within the United States during 
the 1960’s and 1970’s, can propel a state to have a more involved foreign policy on those 
issues. Foreign policy is also associated with a state’s capacity, often in the form of power. A 
state can choose to exercise either hard or soft power, referring to military coercion or a 
state’s use of economic or cultural factors to persuade other actors, respectively. Thus, the 
size of a state’s military, economy, and populations are all important factors in the strength of 
the foreign policy it chooses to pursue. 
 In regards to the United States specifically, its foreign policy has undoubtedly been an 
influential force in the international system. Today, its foreign policy mission as stated by the 
U.S. Department of State, “is to shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just, and 
democratic world and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the 
American people and people everywhere” (U.S. 2015). This has often manifested itself in an 
active foreign policy on the part of the United States, both in military excursions and 
diplomatic ties throughout its sovereign state history. However, when it comes to 
international law, the United States clearly has avoided taking a leadership role in many 
situations, especially in regards to binding environmental agreements. However, this has not 
always been the case. Rather, “For decades, the US was perceived as a leader due to its 
pioneering domestic environmental legislation and for the role it played in promoting various 
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global environmental agreements. It has, however, lost this image as it has failed to ratify 
several important global environmental agreements” (Schreurs 2012).  
The United States has maintained its status of “exceptionalism” since its advent from 
the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville in the mid-19th century. Essentially, this is the idea that 
the United States is inherently different from other states because of its democratic ideals. 
Thus, while the concept typically has its roots in the “liberal character” of the U.S., its 
freedom in politics, economics, and society, it is also based in the prevailing “military 
primacy, economic dynamism, and political diversity” of the United States (Cox and Stokes 
2012, 26). This notion is not necessarily untrue. In fact, the United States is becoming 
exceptional in a myriad of other ways. For example, its environmental footprint is larger than 
that of other nations and its “share of global resource consumption is considerably larger than 
its share of world population” (Brunnee 2004). The belief of exceptionalism may be 
manifesting itself in the United States’ hesitance to cooperate with international governance 
along with the rest of the states in the international system. Simply stated, “Not only is the 
United States said to be disengaging, and increasingly inclined towards unilateral action…it 
is exercising leadership precisely by walking away from an agreement” (Bruneee 2004). In 
other words, the United States’ lack of participation can significantly affect the success of a 
global agreement, with examples like the Kyoto Protocol. The question remains whether 
changing its leadership status, and engaging in passive participation or altogether rejecting 
participation, is in the best interest of the foreign policy goals of the United States. The 
continuation of “American exceptionalism” creates a double standard in that the United 
States takes or refuses actions that would be objectionable were they to be undertaken by 
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another state. Moreover, when the United States declines multilateral action, it can have 
powerful repercussions: 
“US leadership has a unique potential to promote the development of international 
environmental law. Conversely, when the United States declines to exercise 
leadership, the impact is significant” (Brunnee 2004).  
 Often, the public reasoning for the United States’ voluntary exclusion from legally 
binding agreements is due to a perceived lack of clear scientific evidence that the issue in 
question will directly affect the primary goals of its foreign policy, including health of U.S. 
citizens or ensuring its robust economy (Harris 2001, 18). Thus, the United States has 
frequently shown an emphasis for economic gain in the short-term in lieu of resource 
regulation and environmental preservation in the long-term presented in most environmental 
agreements. The U.S. “instead pref[ers] that those resources be exploited to the exclusive 
benefit of U.S. companies” (Harris 2001, 12). In fact, action from the United States typically 
requires the clear presentation of a sizeable issue before its reactive style of action is 
triggered. Overall, “Robust action by the United States is much more likely if there is clear 
scientific evidence that the health of Americans or the U.S. economy” is under threat (Harris 
2001, 17). Essentially, the United States has expressed clear preference for discretion in its 
level and timing of environmental protection, which would be in direct conflict with rules 
and set targets in international environmental agreements. In addition, when the United States 
does deem it necessary to act, it often prefers to avoid environmental agreements in the 
interest of preserving its sovereignty and the regulations enshrined in many of the 
aforementioned treaties (Harris 2001, 18). While the foreign policy paradigm of the United 
States is certainly corroborated across U.S. administrations, it only works to add to the idea 
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of an “exceptional” United States. Notably, this factor of “exceptionalism” is one that avoids 
engagement in international agreements amidst the growing trend of most other countries to 
utilize multilateral efforts and agreements. This lack of engagement in agreements is 
highlighted through the discussion of the aforementioned treaties. When the United States 
does engage in international environmental treaties, it appears to do so with conviction, often 
ratifying before or around similar states with ‘very high’ human development status (see 
Figure 1). Further, when the United States does ratify an agreement, it typically works to 
meet compliance and shows an overall trend of engagement in implementation. Notably, 
however, the United States has refrained to ratify half of the aforementioned treaties. This 
places the average number of agreements ratified by the United States far behind states with 
‘very high,’ ‘high,’ ‘medium,’ and ‘low’ human development levels (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Average Year of Entry into Force of States by ‘Very High’ Development Status 
and the United States 
 
Figure 2. Average Number of Ratifications by Human Development Level and the United 
States 
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 When considering the liberalist theory, several potential issues with the United States’ 
current engagement, or lack thereof, with environmental agreements become apparent. The 
first is seemingly simple—a lack of cooperation and commitment to multilateral actions. 
However, that can eventually manifest itself into an absence of credibility, a far more 
complex issue. Liberalism subscribes to the idea of sustained dialogue and understanding 
between states, which is created through multiple and continued interactions. Like in the 
infamous prisoner’s dilemma, states are likely unwilling to cooperate or achieve maximum 
benefits when the subsequent actions of the other actor are unknown. Unfortunately, the 
option with the most advantageous outcome to both parties, especially in regards to a shared 
resource like biodiversity and its associated ecosystem services, often requires cooperation. 
When states refuse to engage in current multilateral efforts, it is essentially undermining a 
foundation of understanding of other actors and a credibility for following through on 
cooperative agreements. Essentially, “the ongoing interactions and negotiations among 
parties to an MEA [multilateral environmental agreement] tend to generate patterns of 
expectations and normative understandings” (Brunnee, 2004). Fostering a perception as a 
reliable multilateral actor is key in developing credibility, an important facet of soft power. 
Credibility can often allow states to work together in ways that are beneficial in the long-
term, even in the face of short-term drawbacks, like a small loss of sovereignty through 
regulation. The United States has often disregarded the idea of cooperation and 
multilateralism in favor of either unilateral action by addressing issues domestically rather 
than in the internationally binding arena, or not engaging in action to halt biodiversity drivers 
at all. Currently, this strategy is functional for the United States, and even favorable in some 
cases, due to its sizable distribution of power in the international system. Unilateral action 
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has advantages of a preferred course of action without a need for compromise, and 
sometimes efficiency of reaching a specific national goal. However, as that distribution of 
power shifts, potentially away from the reach of the United States, the credibility of the 
United States for cooperation becomes particularly salient. In fact, it is reasonable to assume 
that the United States could become heavily reliant on the understanding and subsequent 
cooperation of other state actors as equals to address fundamentally international issues that 
cannot be adequately addressed by a lone state actor. The importance of having a sustained 
perception as a reliable multilateral actor pertains not only to solving environmental issues, 
but also across the scope of international issues the United States may require cooperation on 
in the future.  
All the aforementioned treaties subscribe to the liberal values of cooperation and state 
credibility on multilateral action. For example, in regards to a dismissal of the Kyoto 
Protocol,  
“Ultimately, soft power rests on credibility. In this context, it matters that the Kyoto 
withdrawal is widely seen as part of a broader pattern. A country’s ability to get others to 
want what it wants will be diminished if it is perceived as a purely self-interested 
actor…In addition, over-reliance on coalitions of the willing, be it in the environmental 
context or beyond, undermines rather than enhances perception of the United States as a 
trustworthy, good faith actor” (Brunee, 2004). 
This same concept applies to other examples from the aforementioned treaties, including 
UNCLOS. The United States has consistently noted solving conflicts in the South China Sea 
(SCS), a geostrategic location and source of international tension, as an “important U.S. 
national objective.” However, addressing the issue via diplomacy has proved a challenge. 
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Notably, several scholars argue that the United States’ lack of ratification of UNCLOS 
presents a greater challenge as a mediator of conflict due to its lack of credibility in the 
region:  
“The United States must ratify UNLCOS if it hopes to be a more credible player in 
preserving stability in the SCS. Whether the United States likes it or not, UNLCOS 
embodies customary international law. Ratification would increase the legitimacy of U.S. 
efforts…and would further enhance the image of the United States among many states in 
East Asia” (Mcdevitt, 2013). 
In regards to the CBD, loss of credibility is perhaps most acute. As stated earlier, 99% of 
recognized countries have ratified the CBD. The United States’ refusal to ratify the document 
makes it a lone state, attempting to address issues of biodiversity loss through unilateral 
means, or not at all. Essentially, the United States is voluntarily choosing to indicate a lack of 
willingness to engage in multilateral agreements, not strengthening and perhaps even 
lessening its credibility, while nearly all other states in the international system are at the 
negotiating table and nurturing relationships. As the most recent agreement addressing a 
driver of biodiversity loss, the SCPOP acts as the most recent conversation on global 
biodiversity loss the United States has opted not to formally take part in. 
 Another issue raised through a liberalist paradigm is a loss of soft power in the long-
term. As already noted, credibility and perception is one important aspect of soft power. 
Another is economic prowess, something the United States is currently not lacking in as the 
world’s largest economy. However, that may not always be true if business-as-usual 
practices, including allowing biodiversity loss to occur at unprecedented rates, is permitted. 
A loss of ecosystem services is a significant strain on economic power. While the science of 
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ecosystem service valuation is still being developed, it is already clear from present 
assessment that attempting to replace ecosystem services can be extremely costly. In some 
cases, replacement is impossible, and is often costlier than simply maintaining healthy 
ecosystems and their functions (Costanza 2014). Biological integrity, preserving biodiversity 
and controlling the drivers of its loss, is integral to ecosystem services continuing to exist 
(Steffen et al. 2015). This is not a small cause for concern. Rather, “at least 40% of the 
world’s economy and 80% of the needs of the poor are derived from biological resources. In 
the USA, for example, commercial fisheries, some of which rely on species in which the 
majority of populations have already gone extinct, provide approximately one million jobs 
and US$32 billion in income annually” (Barnosky et al. 2014). Thus, the United States is 
essentially causing a long-term loss of economic resources in lieu of short-term financial gain 
from an over-exploitation of those resources and other drivers of biodiversity loss. As a state 
that relies heavily on its substantial economic power, using it to both create hard power in the 
form of a military with the largest government endowment in the international system, and be 
the largest donor to organizations such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), current biodiversity loss is an important consideration for future 
financial leverage. 
 Beyond economic capacity, cultural diplomacy is another form of soft power that can 
be depleted by a loss of biodiversity. Cultural diplomacy refers to the “exchange of ideas, 
information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to 
foster mutual understanding” (Mark 2009). Although it is perhaps not the most obvious 
aspect of culture, biodiversity contributes to the culture within the United States, and its 
drivers subsequently degrade the environment of the U.S. For example, deforestation in the 
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United States and the overexploitation of cod fisheries in the Atlantic and the American 
beaver both created a collapse that in some way halted or irrevocably changed an aspect of 
livelihood and culture within the United States. Aspects of culture are important for relating 
to other countries on more than a relatively detached economic or military way. In fact, it is 
the understandings between countries that can be essential for collaboration and cooperation. 
Mentioned earlier, the Democratic Peace theory, which posits that countries connected on the 
premise of democratic values, are less likely to engage in armed conflict, is a core aspect of 
liberal theory, and is a prime example of cultural diplomacy fostering globally positive 
precedents (Kant 1957). Although there are certainly other important culture factors, the 
biodiversity in the United States and around the globe is one such factor that connects each 
country in the pursuit of preserving environmental integrity and resources.  
 Similarly, when considering the constructivist theory, several potential issues with the 
United States’ current engagement, or lack thereof, with environmental agreements become 
apparent. The first is the shifts or development in values and identities surrounding 
environmental issues in the international system. For example, there is arguably a significant 
change in values occurring regarding the importance of a healthy environment, and 
specifically biodiversity. Clearly, from the high participation rates of most states in the 
international system in the aforementioned agreements, there is an overall recognition, and 
subsequent efforts, regarding the necessity to preserve and protect biodiversity. This shift is 
pronounced, especially in recent years, as agreements, such as those evaluated in this paper 
in which 80% or more of states recognized under the near-universal membership of the 
United Nations, are more common. Further, a state’s willingness to undergo the lengthy 
process of negotiation and national ratification of a legally binding agreement represents a 
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shift in norms via a manifestation of salience to a country’s overall policy outlook to address 
environmental issues.  
 The sheer value that is being developed for environmental protection is stated most 
eloquently by the agreements states are continually beginning to enter into. For example, 
directly from the text of the Convention on Biological Diversity:  
“The Contracting Parties, Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological 
diversity…Affirming that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern 
of humankind…Reaffirming also that States are responsible for conserving their 
biological diversity and for using their biological resources in a sustainable 
manner…Noting that, ultimately, the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity will strengthen friendly relations among States and contribute to peace for 
humankind…[and] Determined to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity for 
the benefit of present and future generations” (Convention on Biological 2016, 
“Preamble”). 
Those words were affirmed and ratified by nearly 99% of recognized countries. However, the 
development of global values has not been limited to only percent increases in agreement 
participation. Rather, this phenomenon has been recognized by scholars with increasing 
literature as well. Essentially, “In recent years, the ideology of ecological concern has 
become globalized, and may constitute a worldwide value-orientation as it has been 
institutionalized as part of global governance” (Lawrence and Abrutyn 2015). Pressures in 
the form of global non-governmental organizations, like the IUCN and the World Wildlife 
Fund, are examples of “emerging global movements” that aid in the shaping and 
strengthening of a value on environmental conservation that most states are thusly 
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responding to (Lawrence and Abrutyn 2015, Herd and Dunay 2010, 6-12). Moreover, a 
change or development in identities is likewise in the process of being socially and 
historically constructed. This occurs as values for environmental conservation and protection 
become persistent and enshrined in this period of state interaction, and more states adhere to 
an identity as environmentally conscious. 
 In addition, states appear to be placing more emphasis on the value of multilateral 
agreements and international governance as a strategy for addressing global issues. Once 
again, this is apparent in the sheer number of ratifications in the aforementioned agreements. 
In regards to environmental multilateral agreements, a general consensus of scientific 
knowledge concerning acute deteriorations in environmental integrity has spurred on a wave 
of enthusiasm for “international law and problem-solving through multilateral environmental 
agreements” (Brunnee 2004). This trend was most marked at the Rio Conference in 1992, 
and has only strengthened since.  
 Beyond the development of values and an identity for biological preservation and 
multilateral agreements, these shared values are important for a basis of cooperation. Often, 
cooperation is viewed as occurring “within the framework of a series of shared norms and 
values that build trust over time” (Herd and Dunay 2010, 6-12). Much like the beliefs posited 
by liberalists, constructivists often view shared and developed values, like those of 
environmental preservation, as the foundation for an understanding of trust and common 
ideals that make cooperation possible when states recognize those values as shared. Thus, the 
development of value for environment can support an even broader outcome beyond only 
environmental policy. Rather, shared values can evolve into tools interdependent state actors 
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draw on when exercising an extensive scope of foreign policy issues, including conflict and 
trade negotiations. 
 The United States, as the clear outlier to international environmental agreements, may 
lose its relevance within the international system as its values remain largely on economic 
growth and national security while other states are developing more broadly encompassing 
state priorities. Although the majority of state actors are indicating values on conserving 
environmental integrity and biodiversity, as well as a preference for addressing these 
inherently global issues through multilateral agreements and a development of international 
law, the United States has been either a “reluctant participant” or shows an overall disregard 
for global environmental protection via a kind of “reflexive unilateralism” (Ivanova and Etsy 
2008). In fact, “US enthusiasm for international environmental law appears to have 
diminished since the Rio Summit…The US ratification record on other major MEAs 
{multilateral environmental agreements} negotiated since Rio has also been sluggish” 
(Brunnee 2004). This change in U.S. foreign policy tendencies appears to be occurring at a 
time when others are beginning to subscribe to the concept of international law, and are 
creating a precedent that may become historical; yet, the United States currently has no 
positive or significant role in that. Instead, the United States’ overt hesitance to accept the 
overall values emphasized by other state actors has appeared to persist even while the 
leadership, and even necessity for participation, of the U.S. appears to be declining. In 
essence: “while it is widely recognized that U.S. engagement and cooperation is not just 
important, but historically seen as essential for progress, other nations today seem willing to 
move ahead with or with the United States” (Ivanova and Etsy 2008). Arguably, the United 
States is voluntarily isolating itself from international governance and environmental values 
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at a time coinciding with a significant change in the international system into a world in 
which it may not be the strongest state actor and may be forced to rely on cooperative efforts 
to achieve global goals. Ultimately, the United States may not have the metaphorical footing 
in the historical context of international law, multilateralism, or commitment to the global 
environment that are becoming key components of other state identities and cooperation 
foundations. 
 When looking toward the future of the international system, the implications 
discussed above become even more acute, and provide further support for the United States 
to consider a shift in willingness to participate in international agreements. As the balance of 
power in the international system shifts, likely away from the current hegemony and 
powerful influence of the United States, achieving foreign policy goals will require 
dependence on other state actors, with relationships and precedence of cooperation that the 
United States currently is not fostering. The distribution of power in the international system, 
referred to as polarity, creates the context in which states operate. There are three main 
distribution of power systems—unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. During the Cold 
War, the distribution of power was largely between the two “superpowers” of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Each had its own bloc of states under respective alliances (ie. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact). These blocs were utilized as 
negotiation tools rather than the feared humanity-ending conflict between the two major 
powers. Since the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the consensus on the balance of 
power in the international system has been unipolar, with the United States as a regional 
hegemon, and the most consistently powerful state actor in the international system. 
Harkening back to the discussion of the United States’ vast resources that contribute to its 
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sizable exercise of both hard and soft powers, the control and leadership the United States 
has been able to exert in negotiations and foreign policy is largely rational. However, the 
distribution of power is appearing to shift, and many scholars believe the international system 
is moving towards a multipolar system, in which five or so influential states share the 
majority of the power. Understandably, the United States does not voluntarily want to lose its 
hegemonic status within the international system, and continues to clamber for a significant 
military and economic prowess. Even so, it is clear that other states, including U.S. allies 
such as Germany, China, and even India are positioned to be potentially influential state 
actors in the future.  
Notably, under a multipolar system of power, the shared norms discussed under 
constructivism and the liberalist basis of cooperation are often understood as essential for the 
stability of the system (Mingst 2004, 86-90). Although the United States is certainly still a 
powerful state in the international system, and could easily remain one of the major powers 
in a multipolar system, it could be critical for the success of the U.S.’s foreign policy goals 
that it have a shared foundation of norms, values, and history of cooperation to foster positive 
interactions between and among states. Although the United States is currently pursuing a 
unilateral action within a unipolar paradigm, perhaps even in the interest of maintaining its 
present status, this strategy could ultimately be detrimental in the long-term.  
The potential harm of the U.S.’s “go-it-alone” strategy has been recognized by many 
scholars (Brunnee 2004, Ivanova and Etsy 2008, McDevitt 2013). Notably, many of the core 
arguments for an overall re-engagement in international cooperation through environmental 
agreements have long-term basis for current change in participation. For example, as the 
issues that the United States encounter become increasingly transboundary in nature, 
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“America benefits from worldwide cooperation on these issues and must therefore be willing 
to invest in global governance” (Ivanova and Etsy 2008). Currently, the United States is 
voluntarily restraining from the international law it, and is thus bypassing development of a 
potentially advantageous precedence and legal infrastructure. Further, the missed 
opportunities to cultivate shared values and create a perception of cooperation may also 
result in setbacks in a multipolar system, and that “without credible proof of genuine U.S. 
leadership based on common values and the common good is likely to be met with distrust 
and opposition” (Ivanova and Etsy 2008). In addition to scholars, the importance of 
engagement has also been recognized by influential members of the bureaucracy, and even 
the leaders of the United States. For example, Timothy Wirth, former State Department 
counselor and Undersecretary of State for global affairs, once stated that the new 
administration must reestablish the U.S. leadership in environmental issues as, “the United 
States once again resume the leadership that the world expects of us,” recognizing that past 
efforts had been severely lacking (Harris 2001, 6). Unfortunately, that same sentiment has 
been expressed, and subsequently failed, by even the attempts of heads of state to result in 
lasting changes. While there has been progress towards multilateral action under the Obama 
administration, especially in regards to the formal entrance of the United States to the Paris 
Agreement, there are substantiated fears that change in leadership will result in a loss of 
precedent for the steps that have been slowly made thus far (Somanader 2016). 
 In essence, the United States’ strategy of unilateralism and refusal to engage in 
global multilateral efforts is largely afforded through its status and power in the unipolar 
system. However, that system appears to be changing towards a shared power system, 
regardless of the preferences of the United States. Thus, the United States’ lack of 
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participation in internationally binding environmental agreements on preservation of 
biodiversity today could be one factor in the ultimate hindrance of the United States in 
achieving its future foreign policy goals. 
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VI. Conclusions 
  “There can be no purpose more enspiriting than to begin the age of  
restoration, reweaving the wondrous diversity of life that still surrounds us.” 
–Edward O. Wilson8 
 
 Biodiversity loss is a global issue that promises to endanger the health and livelihood 
of species and societies across the globe without concerted international effort to address its 
anthropogenic accelerators. Fortunately, the international community has increasingly 
become aware of the grave implications of the current trend of biodiversity loss, and has thus 
engaged in multiple negotiations to produce eight vital international agreements to address 
biodiversity loss and its associated drivers that are assessed in this paper. The United States, 
although arguably the most powerful and influential actor in the current international system, 
has repeatedly declined to participate in these agreements. In fact, of the eight agreements 
discussed, the United States has only ratified four. In contrast, nearly all other state actors 
have ratified at least seven. While the disengagement of the United States presents obstacles 
to the effective protection of the global environment, excluding one of the most affluent and 
densely populated state actors in the international system, the United States’ behavior also 
suggests negative implications for fulfilling its own interests. While other state actors are 
currently in the process of developing shared values and precedents of cooperative action, the 
United States is voluntarily choosing to preference unilateral action and a restrained, or 
completely inactive, participation in international environmental law. As the distribution of 
power in the international system shifts, it is likely that the United States will not maintain its 
                                                 
8 Rylander, Jason C. 2012. “Recovering Endangered Species in Difficult times: Can the ESA Go Beyond Mere 
Salvage?” Environmental Law Institute 42(1): 10017-10023. 
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current level of influence and power. Thus, using the liberal and constructivist paradigms, the 
United States will be dependent on cooperation with other state actors to achieve future 
foreign policy goals. However, without credibility in multilateral action and a lack of shared 
values, the United States may be unable to achieve its foreign policy goals, either to their 
fullest extent or at all. Thus, there are clear motivations for the United States to shift its 
current strategy of participation in international agreements through ratification of current 
agreements to one of active participation and ratification of future international efforts to 
stymie biodiversity loss.  
This paper has presented a largely empirical approach to the United States’ 
participation in multilateral agreements on biodiversity loss, presenting facts of participation 
and areas of potential motivations for a reevaluation of engagement in those agreements. 
However, it is important to recognize a wholly normative approach, in which the United 
States is consistently disregarding a duty, a kind of “ethical obligation,” to participate in the 
aforementioned agreements (Harris 2001, 4). Due to the significant share of power and 
wealth the United States, it is reasonable it should share those resources in order to equitably 
protect the most precious living resources on the planet. Further, when considering the 
affluence within the United States, that the average child in the United States “will have 30 
times more impact on the earth’s environment during his or her lifetime than a child born in 
India,” there is a significant argument that the United States owes a concerted effort to the 
rest of the world (Harris 2001, 15). The industrialization of the United States and the 
continued demand of resources from its citizens are responsible for a disproportionate share 
of the drivers of biodiversity loss, including land-use change for agricultural purposes and 
GHG emissions contributing to climate change. This has not gone unnoticed by the rest of 
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the world, with even the Kyoto Protocol designed in a way that fairly accounts for the undue 
burden the early industrialization of states like the U.S. has placed on the environment of 
today and tomorrow. Thus, it is up to the people of the United States and its leadership to 
engage in these agreements in the name of a fair and healthy planet in which all can benefit 
and prosper. 
 Normative statements aside, it is important to recognize the obstacles the United 
States will have to overcome in order to engage in legally binding treaties on biodiversity 
loss, and effectively address the global issue. First, the ratification process within the United 
States is a far more tedious process relative to the process for other states. The separation of 
powers ensured under the U.S. Constitution recognizes that “it is Congress, not the executive 
branch or the president, that has the final say over U.S. environmental policy, both at home 
and abroad” (Harris 2001, 20). Thus, even when there is leadership engaged in international 
agreements, contentions in Congress over sovereignty or economic loss have consistently 
stalled ratification and active U.S. participation. This is evident in the continued attempts 
under the Clinton administration to engage in UNCLOS, the CBD, and the Kyoto Protocol 
while Senate continually refused to ratify the documents. In order to overcome this, an 
emphasis on environmental protection and values placed on biodiversity must be significant 
enough within the populous that it remains on the agenda of Congress, and that 
representatives recognize those agreements as necessary under the “will of the people.” 
Societal movements, like the environmental movement, can have a significant influence in 
the engagement of the United States in these environmental agreements, demonstrated 
through the United States’ ratification and participation in the Ramsar Convention, CITES, 
and MARPOL. However, it is critical that environmental movements create lasting societal 
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norms. Illustrated through the U.S.’s behavior following the decline of environmental 
movement, without a clear desire from the populous for engagement in multilateral 
environmental agreements, the government is willing to allow for dangerous disengagement 
amidst severe environmental degradation. 
 Unfortunately, the topic of the environment and its protection has consistently been 
subject to other topics subverting its importance. Most notably, the understanding that there 
may be a short-term economic loss associated with protecting the environment is known to 
significantly change the environmental priority status of many Americans during times of 
financial duress (Gallup 2016). Unfortunately, the integrity of biodiversity continues to 
accelerate irrespective of the financial status of American voters. Ultimately, the devastating 
capabilities of biodiversity loss will most likely hurt the economy of the United States far 
more in the loss of valuable ecosystem services than the prevention of that loss today would 
cost, and this could even further lower the perceived importance of the environment for many 
Americans. Thus, the encouragement and development of civil society that has a core interest 
in the protection of the environment would help to gather and analyze scientific information 
on the issue, engage in agenda-setting processes, and ensure the compliance of policies once 
they are created. This includes the involvement of non-governmental organizations and 
community cooperation as drivers to necessary international cooperation, and strengthening 
these roles should be encouraged. Without a meaningful understanding of the services a 
healthy environment and biodiversity brings to the planet, it is likely that the normative 
approach of the United States engaging in multilateral efforts will never be realized. The 
power of NGOs and civil society in the name of the environment has been seen before during 
the United States’ Environmental Decade. If that same enthusiasm for environmental 
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protection can be fostered and maintain longevity, the United States is likely to once again 
respond, actively engage in stopping the loss of precious biodiversity, and maintain a healthy 
planet for future generations. 
Undoubtedly, biodiversity loss is one of the most significant and complex challenges 
the United States has encountered. However, it is a challenge that the United States should, 
and must, address with wholehearted commitment. Simply, “On many issues, US 
cooperation is therefore indispensable for problem-solving. Its technological and financial 
resources enable the United States to make decisive contributions to international 
environmental protection efforts” (Brunnee 2004). The United States has resources unrivaled 
by most all other countries. If it begins to actively engage in international efforts to address 
biodiversity loss, its leadership could ultimately be the decisive factor in ensuring ecosystem 
services continue to function and future generations thrive on the same healthy and beautiful 
planet. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Additional International Environmental Agreements Related to Biodiversity Loss 
Name Summary Year Signed 
Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals (CMS) 
Purpose to conserve terrestrial, 
marine and avian migratory 
species throughout their range 
1979 
Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution 
(CLRTAP) 
Intent to protect against and 
reduce air pollution  
1979 
International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling 
Intent to conserve whale stocks 
and regulate the whaling 
industry 
1946 
International Coral Reef 
Initiative 
Purpose to protect coral reefs 
and implement Aichi Target 10 
of the CBD 
1994 
International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC) 
Intent to protect world plant 
resources by preventing the 
introduction and spread of plant 
pests and promoting controls 
1952 
 
International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) 
Intent to ensure food security 
through the conservation, 
exchange and sustainable use of 
the world’s plant genetic 
resources 
2001 
World Heritage Convention 
(WHC) 
 
Identify and conserve the 
world’s cultural and natural 
heritage 
1972 
 
 
Table 4: Overview of Notable Federal Environmental Statutes in the United States 
Statute Name Summary Year Signed into 
Law 
Citation 
Antiquities Act President has the authority to create 
national monuments from public lands 
(ie. protect objects of scientific interest) 
1906 Public Law 59-209, 
Statutes at Large 34 
Stat. 225 
Clean Air Act Controls air pollution 1963 Public Law 88-206, 
Statutes at Large 77 
Stat. 392 
Clean Water Act Controls water pollution 1972 Public Law 92-500, 
Statues at Large 86 
Stat. 816 
Coastal Zone 
Management Act 
Encourages sustainable development and 
management of coastal zones 
1972 Public Law 92-583, 
Statutes at Large 86 
Stat. 1280 
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Federal Land Policy 
and Management 
Act 
Ensures public lands are managed to 
ensure sustainable and enhancing 
practices 
1976 Public Law 94-579, 
Statutes at Large 90 
Stat. 2743 
Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act 
Intended to protect fish and wildlife and 
evaluate impacts of sewage, wastes, and 
pollution on wildlife 
1934 Public Law 85-624, 
16 U.S.C. 661-667e  
Lacey Act Protects plants and wildlife from being 
illegally obtained, possessed, 
transported, and sold 
1900 16 U.S.C. 3371-
3378 
Marine Mammal 
Protection Act 
Prohibits the taking of marine mammals, 
and prevents their import, export, and 
sale 
1972 Public Law 95-522, 
Statutes at Large 86 
Stat. 1027 
National 
Environment Policy 
Act 
Promotes the enhancement of the 
environment 
1969 Public Law 91-190, 
Statutes at Large 83 
Stat. 852 
Marine Protection, 
Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act 
Intended to regulate intentional ocean 
dumping and prevent any dumping of 
material that would adversely affect the 
welfare of the marine environment 
1972 Public Law 92-532, 
Statutes at Large 86 
Stat. 1052 
Resource 
Conservation and 
Recovery Act 
Provides assistance for the proper 
disposal of hazardous waste 
1976 Public Law 94-580, 
Statues at Large 90 
Stat. 2795 
Rivers and Harbors 
Act 
Prohibits the discharge of refuse matter 
and the filling or changing of navigable 
waters without permit 
1899 33 U.S.C. 401, 403, 
407 
Surface Mining 
Control and 
Reclamation Act of 
1977 
Regulates coal mining and land 
reclamation processes 
1977 Public Law 95-87, 
Statutes at Large 91 
Stat. 445 
National Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act 
Protection for designated rivers 1968 16 U.S.C. 1271-
1287 
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